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THE FLIPPER PHENOMENON:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PANAMA DECLARATION
AND THE "DOLPHIN SAFE" LABEL
Nina M. Young, * Win. Robert Irvin, Meredith L. McLean*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past twenty years, few marine conservation issues have
aroused as much public interest as the drowning of dolphins in purse seine
nets.' For a generation that grew up watching the playful antics of Flipper
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1. This article focuses primarily on the use of purse seine nets to harvest yellowfm tuna
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on television, graphic video footage of dolphins hauled to their deaths in
tuna nets was simply too much to stomach. Led by American school
children and their "baby-boomer" parents, consumer boycotts of tuna
spurred tuna harvesters and Congress to adopt measures requiring
"dolphin safe" labeling2 and prohibiting the importation of non-dolphin-
safe tuna into the United States.
Since the adoption of these measures, the number of dolphins killed in
the ETP tuna fishery has dramatically declined.3 Curiously, however,
encirclement of dolphins by tuna fishers occurs as frequently today as it
did before the adoption of "dolphin safe" restrictions.4 In a remarkable
display of innovation and commitment to solving an environmental
problem and a public-relations nightmare, ETP tuna fishers have perfected
fishing methods that allow the encirclement and safe release of dolphins
while tuna are caught. Despite this progress, however, tuna caught in this
manner are still not considered "dolphin safe." Moreover, tuna from other
nations which allow encirclement and safe release are still embargoed
under U.S. law.
Faced with this situation, on October 4, 1995, twelve nations adopted
the Panama Declaration.' This blueprint for developing a legally binding
and enforceable agreement within the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC) is intended to further reduce and eventually
eliminate dolphin deaths caused by tuna fishing operations. The Panama
Declaration forms the basis for an international agreement that will
provide protection for individual dolphin stocks and species to ensure their
in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). The ETP is the area of the Pacific Ocean
bounded by forty degrees north latitude, forty degrees south latitude, 160 degrees west
longitude, and the coasts of North, Central, and South America from Chile to Southern
California, with an area of approximately five to seven million square miles. Regulations
Governing the Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1995).
2. A tuna product considered "dolphin safe" is defined under the Marine Mammal
Protection Act as one that contains tuna caught by a vessel approved by the Secretary of
Commerce and that is accompanied by written certification and endorsements. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1385(d)(2) (1994).
3. See infra Parts II and III, and accompanying notes (discussing U.S. regulatory
measures to reduce dolphin deaths in the eastern Pacific Ocean).
4. See infra notes 216-219 and accompanying text (reviewing relative rates of sets made
on dolphins).
5. Declaration ofPanama, Oct. 4, 1995. The full text of this international agreement was
reprinted in CONG. REC. S. 397 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Panama Declaration].
The signing parties were the governments of Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Spain, United States of America, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Id.
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continued growth and recovery. It will also help reduce the incidental
capture of other marine life, such as sea turtles, sharks, and billfish. Fin-
ally, the Panama Declaration adopts measures designed to guarantee the
sustained health of the tuna fishery and the marine ecosystem of the ET 6
Impeding implementation of the Panama Declaration, however, is the
definition of "dolphin safe." The implementation of the Panama
Declaration calls for "dolphin safe" to be re-defined from its current
meaning of "no encirclement of dolphins" to a more meaningful definition
of "no dolphin mortality."7 Legislation introduced in Congress to
implement the Panama Declaration, which proposes to change the
definition of "dolphin safe," has resulted in a heated debate-one which
pits the Clinton Administration, the fishing industry, several national
environmental groups, and a bipartisan coalition in Congress against an
array of animal welfare and environmental organizations, Hollywood
stars, and their congressional allies! Consequently, quick passage of this
pivotal legislation has been hampered..
This Article explores the history of efforts under the Marine Mammal
Protection Act9 (MMPA or "the Act"), to reduce dolphin mortality,
including the development and implementation of the "dolphin safe" label,
international efforts to reduce dolphin mortality, and the genesis of the
Panama Declaration. This Article concludes by examining the impact that
implementation of the Panama Declaration would most likely have on
dolphins and other marine life in the ETP.
II. THE TUNA DOLPHIN PROVISIONS OF THE
MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
A. The Tuna Dolphin Issue in the 1970s:
The Development of Regulations to Reduce Dolphin Deaths in
the U.S. Tuna Purse Seine Fishery
Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Adt in 1972 for the
purpose of protecting marine mammals, including dolphins, from the
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra Section V(a) and accompanying notes.
9. Marine Mammal Protdction Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421(h) (1994)).
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adverse effects of human activities.'" Although whaling was the issue that
initially brought about the enactment of the MMPA," the incidental take
of dolphins in the ETP tuna purse seine fishery has become symbolic of
the problems confronting marine mammals.' 2
For unknown reasons, schools of yellowfin tuna swim beneath pods of
various dolphin species. 3 Since the late 1940s, tuna fishermen have
increasingly taken advantage of this association and have caught tuna by
setting their nets around schools of dolphins.' 4  In the 1970s,
approximately 200,000 to 400,000 dolphins were killed each year during
tuna purse seine operations,"' despite efforts by fishers to release encircled
10. See H.R. REP. No. 92-707 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4,144 (reporting
on H.R. 10420, proposed legislation for marine mammal protection).
11. Discussing the background and need for new legislation, Senator Hollings revealed
"the committee has learned that man's dealings with marine mammals have in many areas
resulted in over-utilization of this precious natural resource. Many of the great whales which
once populated the oceans have now dwindled to the edge of extinction and although they
have been placed on the U.S. endangered species list, are still being hunted by other
nations.... The commercial hunting of whales has reduced these great mammals to the
point that many may never be able to return to their original population size and balance in
nature." S. REP. No. 863, 1-2 (1972) (quoting supplemental individual report of Sen.
Hollings on S. 2871). In addition, "the number of dolphins killed in the ETP was one of the
driving factors behind the passage of the MMPA in 1972." S. REP. No. 746, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 7 (1992).
12. The major tuna species in the ETP are yellowfin tuna, skipjack, bluefin tuna, bigeye
tuna, black skipjack, and bonito, with purse seiners targeting primarily yellowfin and
skipjack. The major target fish species in the fishery on dolphins is the yellowfin tuna,
though small quantities of skipjack and bigeye tuna are also taken in this way.
13. One theory suggests that the association results from the similar diet of yellowfin
tuna and certain dolphin species. "Preliminary analyses indicate that yellowfin tuna feed
primarily during the day while spotted and spinner dolphins are mainly nocturnal or twilight
feeders. The study suggests that feeding habits may contribute to the formation of the tuna-
dolphin association, but they are probably not the major factor." MARINE MAMMAL
COMMISSION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 103 (1996).
14. During a purse seine fishing operation, when tuna fishers sight schools of dolphin
and yellowfin tuna, they set mile-long purse seine nets around dolphins or encircle dolphins.
Prior to the development of"backdown" procedures, dolphins became entangled in the net,
and were trapped as the bottom or "purse, portion of the net was closed to capture the tuna.
Ultimately, unable to escape or surface to breathe, the dolphins drowned. NATIONAL
RESEARCH COuNcIL, DOLPHINS AND THE TUNA INDuSTRY 13, 34-37 (1992) [hereinafter NRC
REPORT]; see infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing backdown procedure).
15. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) estimated in 1992 that more than
six million dolphins have been killed in the course of purse seine fishing operations by the
United States and foreign fleets in the ETP since 1959. Taking and Importing of Marine
Mammals; Listing of Eastern Spinner Dolphin as Depleted, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,010, 27,014
(1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 216). See also Tim Gerrodette & Paul R. Wade,
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dolphins. Throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, the U.S. fleet
dominated this fishery and was responsible for more than eighty percent
of dolphin deaths. 6
The purpose of the MMPA is to protect marine mammal species 7 of
"great international significance, esthetic and recreational as well as
economic. " " Marine mammal species should be "protected and
encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with
sound policies of resource management."' 9 Another of the Act's purposes
is to maintain the "health and stability of the marine ecosystem.
"2
Whenever consistent with these goals, marine mammals are to be
protected and managed so that they do not "cease to be a significant
functioning element of the ecosystem of which they are a part,"21 or
"diminish below their optimum sustainable Population."'  Through the
MMPA, Congress sought to achieve broad protection for marine
mammals by establishing a moratorium on importation and taking.' The
Act also states a goal that the "incidental kill or incidental serious injury
of marine mammals permitted in the course of commercial fishing
operations be reduced to insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality
and serious injury rate."'
Status ofDolphin Stocks Affected by the Tuna Purse-Seine Fishery in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific: A 36-Year Summary, Abstract, ELEVENTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON THE BIOLOGY
OF MARINE MAMALS 43 (1995) [hereinafter Gerrodette & Wade, 36-Year Summary].
16. MARINEMANMAL COMMISSION, 1995 ANN AL REPORT TO CONGRE s 99 (1996).
17. The marine species protected under the MMPA are whales, dolphins, porpoises,
seals, sea lions, walruses, sea otters, manatees, dugongs, and polar bears. See generally 16
U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1994).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1994).
19. Id.
20. Id
21. Id § 1361(2).
22. Id Optimum sustainable population (OSP) means, "with respect to any population
stock, the number of animals which will result in the maximum productivity of the
population or the species, keeping in mind the carrying capacity of the habitat and the health
of the ecosystem of which they form a constituent element." Id. § 1362(9).
23. "The term 'take' means harass, hunt, capture or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt,
capture, or kill any marine mammal." 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994). The statute further
provides that "[t]here shall be a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine
mammals and marine mammal products ... during which time no permit may be issued for
the taking of any marine mammal and no marine mammal or marine mammal product may
be imported into the United States except in [enumerated] cases." Id. § 1371(a).
24. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
1997]
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To address the problem of incidental take in fisheries generally, and the
tuna purse seine fishery in particular, Congress included in the MMPA a
"general permit" requirement.' Initially, the MMPA gave commercial
fisheries a two-year exemption from the moratorium and the general
permit system. 26 During this period, U.S. vessels in the tuna purse seine
fishery killed 368,600 dolphins in 1972 and 206,697 dolphins in 1973.27
Foreign fisheries killed an estimated 55,078 and 58,276 dolphins in those
years.2 In 1974, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), which
is responsible for administering the MMPA for these species, issued a
general permit allowing the U.S. tuna purse-seine fleet to take an
unlimited number of dolphins until December 31, 1975.29 This permit
prompted litigation that invalidated the permit and required
population-specific quotas."
Amended emergency regulations for 1976 set an aggregate incidental
take quota of 78,000 dolphins.31 The quota was reached and, after the
25. Id. § 1371(a)(1).
26. This exception states that "[m]arine mammals may be taken incidentally in the
course of commercial fishing operations .. " Id. § 1371(a)(2). See also Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, § 101(a)(2), 86 Stat. 1030. As explained in the
Senate report for the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
[Section] (a)(2) provides another exception allowing the incidental taking of marine
mammals in commercial fishing operations. This exception would apply to the killing
of porpoises in the course of tuna fishing as well as killing of seals or sea lions when
they interfere with salmon or other commercial fisheries. During the first 2 years after
effectiveness of the Act, these takings would be governed by regulations issued under
section 111. Thereafter, they would be permitted under the usual regulations and
permit provisions of section 103 and 104.
S. REP. No. 92-863, at 13 (1972).
27. MARiNE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 94 (1992).
28. Id.
29. See General Permit Issued, 39 Fed. Reg. 38,403 (NOAA 1974) (announcing
issuance of general permit).
30. See Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297
(D.D.C.), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976). In 1976, several environmental groups
challenged the legality of the regulations that permitted purse-seine fishing for yellowfin
tuna "on dolphins," in an action brought in the District Court for the District of Columbia.
On May 11, 1976, Judge Charles R. Richey issued an opinion and order declaring the
Commerce regulations, general permit, and certificates of inclusion issued to tuna fishermen
void, as contrary to the provision of the MMPA that requires the NMFS to determine and
publish reasonable estimates of the existing population levels of each species affected by the
regulations, the optimum sustainable population level of each species, and the impact of
those regulations on the species' ability to reach its optimum sustainable population. Id. at
312-14.
31. Incidental Taking in the Course of Commercial Fishing Operations, 41 Fed. Reg.
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tuna industry obtained a temporary restraining order against enforcement,
the kill surpassed 108,000 animals.32 In 1977, NMFS again conducted
general permit procedures. After a lengthy on-the-record hearing, NMFS
issued a three-year general permit with annual quotas set on a sliding scale
(1978-51,945; 1979-41,610; 1980-31,150). Accompanying this quota
was a requirement that NMFS observers be placed on fishing vessels.
Also, several fishing gear and procedural restrictions were implemented,
such as requiring use of the Medina PanelM and the backdown procedure
in tuna purse seine fishing operations.3 ' During these three years,
incidental killings of dolphins in the ETP dropped substantially (1978-
19,366; 1979-17,938; 1980-15,305). 36 This was due in large part to the
use of fishing gear and procedures that reduced dolphin mortality.
B. The Tuna Dolphin Issue in the 1980s-
Further Regulation of the US. Tuna Fleet
On December 1, 1980, after another on-the-record hearing, NMFS
issued a general permit through 1984 with a static, total annual incidental
take quota of 20,500 dolphins for all species combined.37 The permit also
imposed additional observer requirements and other regulations governing
23,680 (1976) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2)(i)(A)).
32. 1980 NOAA, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIEs SERVICE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 4.
33. I at 1.
34. A Medina Panel is comprised of strips of fine-mesh sections of net that are about
thirty-three feet in length. These panels "are placed adjacent to the backdown area and
below the corkline. The fine mesh is small enough to prevent the entanglement of the
corkline. The fine mesh is small enough to prevent the entanglement of the snouts and
flippers of dolphins in the net." NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 19-20.
35. 1980 NOAA, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIEs SERVICE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 2. The backdown process consists of pulling the seine out from under the herd
of dolphins. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 36. Backdown was developed because,
although capable of doing so, the dolphins were not jumping over the corkline of the net and
escaping. Id In the backdown process, "the seiher is put into reverse after about one half
of the net has been rolled aboard. This has the effect of forming the net into a long, narrow
channel and causing the corkline at the apex of the channel to sink. The dolphins are herded
towards the apex where they can then swim over the sunken corks." Id. See also id. at 82-
86 (discussing modifications to improve escape of dolphins from nets).
36. MARINEMAMMAL COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 94 (1992).
37. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations, 45 Fed.
Reg. 72,178, 72,196 (1980) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24).
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fishing gear and techniques, including a ban on "sundown sets."3  NMFS
was also directed by the NOAA Administrator to monitor the fleet to
determine whether it was feasible to further reduce the quota within the
next five years, and to conduct a complete assessment of the affected
dolphins by no later than 1984.39
In 1980, 15,305 dolphins were killed by the U.S. tuna fleet.' Although
the U.S. tuna fishery had made substantial progress in reducing dolphin
mortality, it was clear that a level of deaths "approaching zero," as
required by the MMPA, was not likely to be achieved by the tuna
industry.41 Consequently, Congress amended the MMPA by specifying
that the goal of the Act in approaching zero "shall be satisfied in the case
of the incidental taking of marine mammals in the course of purse seine
fishing for yellowfin tuna by a continuation of the application of the best
marine mammal safety techniques and equipment that are economically
and technologically practicable."'42
In 1984, Congress continued the general permit requirements for this
fishery for an indefinite period, thereby effectively legislating an
incidental take authorization. 43 The 1984 amendments retained the static
38. Sets on dolphin made around the time of sundown at the completion of a fishing
day, referred to as "sundown sets," were found to cause higher mortality rate of dolphins.
See 58 Fed. Reg. 63,536, 63,537 (1993) (giving sundown set background). In recognition
of the higher mortality rates found in sundown sets, the Commerce Department proscribed
regulations to prevent the high rates of mortality. Id. at 72,187-96. The prohibition on
sundown sets is as follows:
On every set encircling porpoise, the backdown procedure must be completed and
rolling of the net to sack-up must be begun before one-half hour after sundown ...
sundown is defined as the time at which the upper edge of the sun disappears below
the horizon or, if view of the sun is obscured, the local time of sunset calculated from
tables developed by the U.S. Naval Observatory.
50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(1)(vii)(C) (1995).
39. 1980 NOAA, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 9.
40. MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 94 (1992).
41. Because Congress did not want to shut down or significantly curtail the activity of
the tuna fleet so long as the fleet was adhering to the regulations, Congress had to adopt
another mechanism to enable the tuna fleet to achieve the zero mortality rate goal. H.R. REP.
No. 97-228, at 13-14 (1981).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1994).
43. The 1984 amendments to the MMPA amended subsection (h) of Section 104, which
authorized the issuance of general permits for the taking of marine mammals. The
amendments added a new paragraph that would extend the permit in force, which was
granted to the American Tunaboat Association, on December 1, 1980, for an indefinite
period subject to a number of specific conditions. H.R. REP. No. 98-758, at 8 (1984). See
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quota of 20,500 and continued the various fishing gear, technique, and
observer requirements of the regulations. In doing so, the status quo
under the 1980 permit was preserved.' Although the 1984 amendments
ensured a mortality level that was deemed to be acceptable at the time,4'
the "legislated permit" also removed the on-the-record hearing
requirement and the regulatory mechanism that had provided the means
to apply continually more stringent requirements and lower quotas during
each permit renewal cycle.' Because a quota was legislatively set, there
was no longer a regulatory tool available, other than an amendment to the
MMPA, for NMFS to further reduce quotas. In combination with the
preceding congressional action to waive the zero mortality rate goal, the
1984 legislative permit slowed research and gear improvement, as well as
reductions in dolphin mortality.
Although it is difficult to say whether take levels would have been
reduced further had the tuna fishery been required to apply for additional
general permits, it is clear that legislating the zero mortality goal in 1981
and the quota in 1984 did little to improve the status quo. In the four
years from 1977 to 1980, under a general permit issued through the
regulatory process, the average annual number of dolphins killed by U.S.
vessels in the ETP tuna fishery was 19,515.' 7 The kill dropped from
108,740 in 1976 to 15,305 in 1980.48 From 1980 to 1984, under another
regulatory general permit, the average annual kill was 16,719. 41 It should
be noted that this average was affected by a substantial drop in mortality
(to 8,513) in 1983, attributable to an El Niflo event." After the general
also Modification of General Permit, 50 Fed. Reg. 1099 (1985) (modifying permit).
44. H.R. REP. No. 97-228, at 9. In addition, the amendments provided a limited quota
for two species for which no quotas are provided for under the general permit The provision
allowed the incidental take of up to 250 coastal spotted dolphins and up to 2,750 eastern
spinner dolphins. These quotas were to be included within the overall annual quota of
20,500 dolphins in the general permit. H.R. REP. No. 98-758, at 9.
45. The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries reported that: "This level of
take is not viewed by scientists for NMFS, the tuna industry, or major environmental groups
as likely to significantly adversely affect the porpoise stocks in question." Id. at 5.
46. Id
47. See MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssION, 1995 ANNuAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 100
(1996) (reviewing estimated incidental kill of dolphins in ETP tuna purse seine fishery,
1972-1995).
48. Id
49. Id.
50. Id. See also NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 58 (discussing El Nifto event
disrupting ETP fishery). An "El Nifio" event changes oceanographic conditions, especially
199'7]
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permit was "legislated," the average annual kill increased over the 1984
to 1988 period to 18,400."'
Because of the continuing controversy surrounding determinations of
historic and current population estimates in relation to OSP 2 Congress
directed NMFS to conduct a five-year program to monitor abundance
trends in dolphin populations.5 3 Such studies were not required prior to
1984. Although NMFS had continued to count and assess stocks in
preparation for a formal permit proceeding in 1984, this work was halted
by the 1984 amendments. The studies eventually took place from 1986
to 1990.
54
C. The Tuna Dolphin Issue in the Mid-1980s-
The Transition to Regulating the Foreign Fishery
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the United States fleet in the ETP declined
while the number of foreign vessels participating in the purse seine fishery
grew.5  Specifically, by 1984, the U.S. fleet had declined from ninety-
four vessels in 1980 to approximately forty-two vessels. 6 This decline
was due, in part, to U.S. vessels fishing under the flags of other nations 7
patterns in temperature fields and thermocline depth, which may drive tuna deeper, making
them less available to surface fishing gear, or shifting the location of productive fishing
grounds to areas not normally fished by the ETP fleet. Id.
51. H.R. REP. No.97-228, at 13-14 (1981) (reviewing mortality data).
52. See supra note 22. Determining OSP requires an estimation of historic stock size
in order to numerically define the upper and lower limits of OSP. In addition, NMFS must
also estimate the current stock size to determine whether this estimate is above the lower
limit of OSP and is, therefore, sufficient to allow for an incidental take under the MMPA.
However, NMFS was unable to precisely determine these estimates due to a lack of mortality
data for the period 1959-1972, variable estimates of net recruitment, and technical problems
inherent in estimating stock size. H.R. REP. No.98-758, at 5 (1984).
53. Id.
54. See Tim Gerrodette & Paul Wade, ESTIMATES OF CETACEAN ABUNDANCE AND
DISTRIBUTION ON THE EASTERN TROPICAL PACIFIC, 43 REP. INT'L WHALING COMM'N 477-93
(1993) [hereinafter Gerrodette & Wade: ESTIMATES OF CETACEAN ABUNDANCE].
55. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 17, 19, 70.
56. Id. at 19.
57. "A significant fraction of the reductions in the number of vessels in the U.S. eastern
tropical Pacific tuna fleet since the 1970s can be traced to the re-flagging of vessels. Since
1979, fifty-eight U.S. purse seiners have been transferred to foreign flags, with seventeen
going to Venezuela, ten to Vanuatu, ten to the Republic of Korea, four to Mexico, and
seventeen to eight other countries." MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 99 (1991).
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to evade MMPA regulations and to avoid the high operating and labor
costs in the United States. 8 By the late 1980s, the foreign purse seine
fleets in the ETP-primarily those of Mexico and Venezuela-numbered
more than ninety vessels.5 9 In addition, the proportion of the catch taken
by the U.S. vessels decreased from ninety percent in 1960 to thirty-two
percent in 1988 and eleven percent in 1991, while the Latin American
nations catch increased from ten percent in 1960 to forty-seven percent in
1988 and fifty-seven percent in 1991.'
The international tuna fleet, now larger than the U.S. fleet, began to
contribute heavily to dolphin mortality in the ETR In fact, the combined
U.S./foreign estimated kill levels for most of the 1980s exceeded the
combined kill estimates of the late 1970s.6' In 1986, more dolphins were
killed in the combined U.S./foreign tuna fishery (133,174) than in any
year since 1976.62 United States fishers, noting the level of dolphin kills
by these foreign fleets in the ETP, requested that Congress focus on limit-
ing foreign fleet dolphin mortality as an issue of equity.63 This request,
in conjunction with widespread public concern over the protection of
dolphin stocks, led Congress to amend the MMPA in 1984 and 1988. 64
To address foreign take, Congress in 1984 amended the MMPA to
require that each nation exporting tuna to the United States had to adopt
a program comparable to that of the United States and that the average
rate of take by its fleet must be comparable to that of the U.S. fleet.65 The
law required foreign fleets to satisfy two conditions: (1) to adopt a
regulatory program governing the incidental taking of marine mammals
58. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 17, 19, 70.
59. See MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssIoN, 1991 ANNuAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 93
(1992) (recounting decline in U.S. fleet and growth of foreign fleets).
60. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 17.
61. See MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 94
(1992) (summarizing estimated kill levels in ETP fishery, 1972-1991).
62. Id. The foreign fishery caused 112,482 estimated dolphin deaths while the U.S.
fleet caused 20,692 estimated deaths. Id
63. "During the March 15, 1984, Subcommittee hearing, and in discussion with
concerned domestic interests, concerns were also expressed about the degree to which
foreign nations engaged in the tuna purse seine fishery in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean
are taking appropriate steps to minimize the incidental taking of porpoises." H.R. REP. No.
98-758, 6 (1984).
64. "The Subcommittee determined that it was necessary to strengthen the requirements
of the Act with respect to documentation of compliance by foreign nations with the essential
features of the MMPA." Id.
65. Act of July 17, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-364, 98 Stat. 440.
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in the course of tuna fishing that is comparable to that of the United
States; and (2) to assure that the average rate of that incidental taking by
the vessels of a fishing nation is comparable to the average rate of
incidental taking of marine mammals by United States vessels in the
course of tuna purse seining.66 Because the agency lacked guidance on
what the Congress meant by "comparability," NMFS did not issue
regulations until March 1988.67
Clarification of the term "comparability" was provided in the 1988
amendments. These amendments also required intermediary nations68
exporting tuna to the United States to provide proof that they have acted
to prohibit the importation of tuna from those nations prohibited from
exporting tuna directly to the United States.69 In order for a foreign
nation to export tuna and tuna products to the United States, that nation's
government had to provide reasonable documentation that it met the
following specific comparability standards:
(1) that by 1990 the foreign nation would have in place a regulatory
program that contained prohibitions against encircling pure schools of
dolphin species other than spotted, striped, or common dolphins,
conducting sundown sets, and other activities as are made applicable to
U.S. vessels;7"
(2) an average rate of incidental taking no greater than 2.0 times that
of U.S. vessels during the same period by the end of the 1989 fishing
season, and no greater than 1.25 times that of U.S. vessels by the end of
the 1990 fishing season and thereafter;7
(3) a level of incidental take for eastern spinner dolphins and coastal
spotted dolphins that does not exceed fifteen and two percent respectively
of the total number of all marine mammals taken by that nation during that
year; 7
2
66. Id.
67. See 53 Fed. Reg. 8910 (1988) (establishing regulations governing importation of
tuna in association with marine mammals).
68. The term "intermediary nation" means, "a nation that exports yellowfin tuna or
yellowfin tuna products to the United States and that imports yellowfin tuna or yellowfin
tuna products that are subject to a direct ban on importation into the United States pursuant
to section 1371(a)(2)(B)." 16 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1994).
69. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(C). See also H.R. REP. No. 100-970, at 30 (1988); S. REP. No.
100-592, at 25 (1988).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (1994).
71. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
72. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(III).
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(4) an observer program, implemented by IATTC or other international
program, with coverage comparable to that achieved by the United States
during that same period unless the Secretary of Commerce finds and
approves an alternative observer program that will give reliable estimates
of the average rate of incidental take.73
The 1988 MMPA amendments also called for a skipper performance
standard and supplemental training program;74 an observer program;7' a
prohibition on sundown sets;76 and, a prohibition on the use of certain
explosives.'
Another amendment focused on identifying appropriate new methods
of locating and catching yellowfin tuna without the incidental capture of
dolphins.7" In addition, the Secretary of Commerce was instructed to have
the National Academy of Sciences convene a National Research Council
(NRC) panel to "identify new alternative tuna fishing techniques designed
to reduce or eliminate the incidental mortality of porpoise and, within one
year, to submit a research, development, and implementation plan of
alternative fishing techniques to Congress."7 9 Upon completion of this
study, the NRC recommendations included skipper education and
monitoring; research to improve current fishing practices to eliminate
dolphin mortality; scientific research on tuna and dolphin biology and
behavior; research into alternative fishing techniques that do not depend
on setting on dolphins and other scientific research and technological
development suggestions.' The NRC also recommended that an
assessment be made of the impact that discontinuation of purse seining
would have on tuna populations."1
The NRC study concluded that "no methods of catching tuna without
killing dolphins currently available or capable of rapid development are
73. Id § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).
74. See Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711,
102 Stat. 4755, § 4(d)(vi) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(vi) (1994)). See also 50
C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2)(vi) (1995).
75. Pub. L. No. 100-711 § 4(d)(viii) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1374(h)(2)(B)(viii),
1383a(e) (1994)). See also 50 C.F.R § 216.24(f) (1995).
76. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2)(vii)(C) (1995).
77. Pub. L. No. 100-711 § 4(d)(viv) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2)(B)(vii)). See
also 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2)(vii)(E) (1995); 55 Fed. Reg. 11,588 (1992).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 1380(a)(1) (1994).
79. Id § 1380(a)(2).
80. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 110-19.
81. Id. at 117.
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as efficient as current methods of catching large yellowf'm tuna in the
ETP."
82
III. THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE DOLPHIN SAFE LABEL AND POLICY
A. The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act
In 1988, over 60,000 dolphins died in the foreign yellowfim tuna
fishery.8 3 That number climbed to more than 84,000 in 1989, then
dropped to approximately 47,000 in 1990, and around 26,000 in 1991, as
nations began to implement the conservation programs and other
requirements of the MMPA. 4 As dolphin mortality continued at fairly
high levels, even after the 1988 amendments to the MMPA, Congress
responded to the renewed public outcry' with a bill entitled the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act of 1990 (DPCIA). 6 Initially, the
bill would have required that all tuna products caught using either purse
seine nets on dolphins or drift gillnets8 bear the statement: "The tuna in
this product has been captured with technologies that are known to kill
dolphins., 88 All other tuna products would be labeled "dolphin safe."s9
Faced with threatened consumer boycotts and recognizing the
opportunity for a "green" marketing strategy, the major tuna canning
companies took steps to preempt expected adverse market impacts of the
proposed legislation. 90 On April 12, 1990, Starkist Seafood Company, a
82. See H.R. REP. No. 102-746, at 10-11 (1992) (quoting 1992 report by National
Academy of Sciences).
83. See supra note 27, at 117.
84. Id.
85. "Despite progress that has been made under the MMPA, many conservation and
animal rights groups have continued to argue that the original purpose of the MMPA as it
affects dolphin should be respected, and that the practice of intentionally deploying nets to
encircle dolphins should be ended." H.R. REP. No. 101-579, at 5 (1990).
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1385 (1994).
87. The term "driftnet" means a gillnet composed of a panel of plastic webbing one and
one-half miles or more in length. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1385(c) (1994). For the purposes of this
section, the term driftnet has the meaning given to that term in section 4003 of the Driftnet
Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-220, 101 Stat. 1477
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1822 note (1994)).
88. H.R. REP. No. 101-579, at 6 (1990).
89. Id.
90. U.S. INT'LTRADECOMM'N, PIB.NO. 2547, TUNA: CURRENTISSutESAFFECINGTHE
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division of H.J. Heinz Co., announced that it would no longer purchase
any tuna caught in association with dolphins.9' It further stated that it
would begin labeling cans of Starkist tuna with "dolphin safe" symbols
bearing the message: "No Harm to Dolphins."' Van Camp Seafood
(Chicken of the Sea) and Bumblebee announced, some hours later, that
they would adopt the same "dolphin safe" purchasing practice and begin
labeling their tuna as "dolphin safe." These three companies together
supply approximately eighty-four percent of the canned tuna sold in the
United States. 3 During the following weeks, several smaller suppliers of
U.S. canned tuna, including Mitsubishi Foods, Mitsui Foods, Ocean
Packing Corporation, Pan Pacific and Kraft General Foods announced
they would no longer purchase tuna caught by methods considered unsafe
for dolphin. 94
Following this voluntary action, the environmental community and the
tuna canners worked cooperatively throughout the year to refine the
DPCIA and secured its passage in November 1990. The version did not
mandate a label stating the tuna was caught with methods known to kill
dolphins, but instead required that all tuna caught in the ETP and labeled
"dolphin safe" (1) must have been caught by a vessel too small to deploy
its nets on dolphins; or (2) must be accompanied by a certification from
a qualified observer that no dolphin sets were made for the entire trip on
which the tuna was caught; or (3) cannot have been harvested using a
large-scale driftnet.95
Certification that tuna is "dolphin safe" by an observer, or the vessel
captain, accompanies the tuna to the cannery where the product is labeled
accordingly.96 NMFS implemented regulations in September 1991 that
firmly established a tracking and verification system codifying the volunt-
U.S. TUNA INDUSTRY, REPORT TO TIE SENATE COMMITEE OF FINANCE 3-1 (1992)
[hereinafter ITC TUNA INDUSTRY REPORT].
91. 56 Fed. Reg. 47,418, 47,419 (1991).
92. Id.
93. H.R REP. NO. 101-579, at 7(1990).
94. Id See also, Anita Manning, The Net Effect on Dolphins-More Foreign Fishing
Boats Pose a Risk, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 1990, at Life 1.
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d).
96. Id It is a violation of section 45 of Title 15 to affix a dolphin safe label to any tuna
product harvested anywhere on the high seas by a vessel that uses driftnets, or in the ETP,
if there is no accompanying documentation signed by the vessel captain, the Secretary's
designee (typically an on-board observer), and each exporter, importer, and processor of the
product, certifying that no purse seine nets were intentionally deployed on dolphins during
the entire fishing trip on which the tuna were harvested. Id.
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ary measures taken by the tuna canners.' This system enables the federal
government to track tuna labeled "dolphin safe" back to the harvesting
vessel in order to verify whether the product was properly labeled.98
Domestically, the announcement resulted in the U.S. purse seine fleet
shifting to overseas operations in the western tropical Pacific (WTP)
where tuna and dolphins apparently do not associate as often as they do
in the ETP.99 This was the final blow to the U.S. domination of the ETP
tuna fishery. The U.S. tuna fleet which had dwindled from 155 in 1976
to thirty-nine vessels in 1988,"° fell to only thirteen in 1991.101
B. Impact of the Label on US. Tuna Market
The impact of the DPCIA on fishers, processors, and the canned tuna
market was predicated on the assumption that the public would be willing
to pay more for dolphin safe tuna. 02 Supporters of the DPCIA expected
that the increased cost to consumers would trickle back to processors to
compensate them for the increased costs of compliance, or to fishers to
create an incentive to harvest tuna caught without encircling dolphins.
However, the exact extent to which this would actually occur was
uncertain.0 3 An economic analysis of the impact of the dolphin safe
policies on the U.S. tuna industry was compiled by the U.S. International
Trade Commission, and published in 1992. The study was commissioned
in September 1991, and the time period since the policy's implementation
was too short, at that time, to allow significant statistical evaluation of the
policy effects on prices. 4 Furthermore, a number of events unrelated to
97. 56 Fed. Reg. 47,418 (1991).
98. Id.
99. See NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 45-48 (discussing tuna-dolphin association).
100. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 102 (1996).
101. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 93 (1992).
Of the thirteen U.S. vessels fishing for tuna in the ETP during 1991, only two to six fished
for tuna by setting on dolphin. Id.
102. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendment: Hearings on H.K 2926 Before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1989) (statement of
Congresswoman Barbara Boxer); see also id. at 30-32, 116-134 (statement of Dennis M.
King, Senior Resource Economist, ICF Incorporated).
103. Id. at 124 (statement of Dennis M. King).
104. ITC TUNA INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 90, at 3-16. The Senate Finance
Committee's request for the investigation came shortly after the implementation of the
dolphin safe policies, in the early fall of 1991.
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dolphins occurred simultaneously with the implementation of the dolphin
safe policy which could not be easily distinguished from effects caused by
the dolphin safe policies. These factors were taken into consideration
when attempting to draw some conclusions on the effects of the dolphin
safe policy on the tuna market.
The study found that the economic effects of the dolphin safe policy
differed by sector (harvesting vs. processing) and by time horizon (the
short term vs. the long term).'0 5 According to the report, the economic
effects also differed for albacore (white meat) and tropical (lightmeat)
tuna, with tropical tuna being the product directly affected by the dolphin
safe policies. "0
In the short period following the implementation of the dolphin safe
policies, the prices for tropical tuna declined, and at that time, were
expected to remain lower than they would have been without the dolphin
safe policies."°r "The policies have forced vessels to move to the WTP,
where tuna are more abundant and require lower variable costs of
harvesting."'08 The price for skipjack, the species which is more abundant
in the WTP than in the ETP and is caught without setting sets on dolphins,
experienced a "significant but somewhat smaller" decline in price than
yellowfin. °9 Yellowfin, the species most affected by the canners' policy,
experienced a drop from a 1990 first-quarter level of $968 per short ton
to a low of $740 in the last quarter of 1991.110 In the long term, however,
tropical tuna prices were expected to increase again, as resource depletion
increased variable harvesting costs."'
The fishers' shift from the ETP tuna fishery to the WTP fishery led the
International Trade Commission (ITC) to conclude that dolphin safe
policies were at least partly responsible for the depressed short-term prices
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id at 3-17. "The reduction in raw-tuna prices occurred quickly. May 1, 1990 was
the effective date of the price contract between U.S. canners and the American Tuna Sales
Association (the fishermen's marketing organization) that immediately followed the canners'
implementation of their April 1990 dolphin safe policy. On that date contracted prices fell
by 11 to 20 percent (depending on species and size)." Id at 3-17, 18.
108. Id.
109. ITC TUNA INrDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 90, at 3-18. Skipjack experienced a unit-
value decline in price from a pre-policy level of $864 to $785 in 1991. Id.
110. Id. at3-18.
111. Id.
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and average unit values for raw tropical tuna."' Smaller tuna of any one
species receive a lower price from the canner than do large tuna of the
same species because the processing costs for small tuna are higher.'
The ITC concluded that:
[A]lthough the average unit value for a vessel's delivery of tuna from
the ETP will probably be lower because of the policies, the total cost
of a unit of canned tuna processed from that delivery (and therefore
the wholesale price of canned tuna) is unlikely to be lower for all
canners. 114
Furthermore, depressed prices were expected to continue as long as the
relatively high abundance of tuna in the WTP enabled fishermen to fill
their vessel holds more quickly than in the ETP, thus increasing the
supply of raw tuna available to canners. 1 5
The wholesale price of domestic canned lightmeat (tropical) tuna
declined immediately following the dolphin safe policy implementation." 6
This was also the trend in prices for the raw-tuna market. The wholesale
price of canned whitemeat (albacore) tuna followed a similar pattern after
the dolphin safe policies were implemented, but did not decline like prices
did in the canned lightmeat market in 1991.117 The ITC study noted that
"the decline in prices in the mid-1990s appears to be largely attributable
to the canners' policy announcement. According to industry sources it
reflects the attempt by U.S. canneries to move the old dolphin unsafe
inventory to make room for the new dolphin safe product."' 1 8 The ITC
study also concluded that canned-lightmeat prices were expected to be
slightly lower than they would have been without the policies, as long as
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 3-18.
115. Id. The ITC report notes that according to industry sources, "the increase in the
WTP has been so great that the waiting period for a vessel to unload at the canneries in
American Samoa has lengthened significantly." Id.
116. Id. at3-19.
117. Id.
118. Id. The canneries were compelled to get the tuna labeled dolphin safe on retail
shelves quickly in light of the publicity generated by the announcement of their dolphin safe
policy. Other factors contributing to the lower prices in the 1990 included a "heavy
inventory overhang" existing at the year's end in 1989, which canners became aware of in
1990. Id.
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the harvest rates in the WTP continue to be unusually high.1 9 The overall
long-term effect on the U.S. supply of, canned lightmeat tuna was
determined to be uncertain under the ITC study, because imports were
expected to be higher, and domestic production lower, than if the dolphin
safe policies had not been implemented. 0
C. Consumer Reaction to the Dolphin Safe Label
The dolphin safe policies appear to have had both beneficial and
detrimental effects on the marketing of canned tuna.' According to one
study, "some consumers appear to have returned to tuna after boycotting
it while it was dolphin-unsafe, but others, who were unaware of the
problem until the canners' announcement, appear paradoxically to have
cut back or ceased their tuna consumption. "" According to the testimony
of a tuna industry official, the canners were unable'to fully pass on to the
consumer the various costs caused by the policies." At the time the ITC
analysis of the impact of the dolphin safe policies was conducted, the IC
found the net effect of the policies on canned-tuna marketing to be un-
clear. It leaned toward a negative finding in light of the fact that between
1990 and 1991 retail sales of canned tuna fell by 2.5%. "
Immediately following the implementation of the dolphin safe label,
tuna canning companies launched a full-tilt marketing campaign for
dolphin safe tuna." Some in the industry asked whether these efforts
119. ITC TUNA INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 90, at 3-19.
120. lad at 3-22. If the increase in canned-tuna imports exceeds the decline in domestic
production, prices will fall, and vice versa. Id.
121. This is according to some of the industry's marketing research, as reported in the
ITC study. See id at 3-19 (discussing short-term effects in market for canned tuna).
122. Id
123. See ido at 3-19 n.65 (citing Michael McGowan, vice president, Bumble Bee
Seafoods, transcript of the hearing, Feb. 4, 1992). The ITC study further notes that a
reduction in the perceived quality of the canned tuna product, because of the increased
proportion of skipjack from the WTP in the can, may have made it difficult for U.S. canners
to maintain traditional price levels in the canned-tuna market, and thus to pass on any
possible prices increases. Id at 3-19.
124. ITC TUNA INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 90, at 3-19; but see id. at 3-19 n.66
(finding that drop in sales could also be explained by effects of U.S. recession).
125. See Michael J. McDermott, Charlie and the Mermaid Sing a Different Tuna, FOOD
&BEVERAGEMARKETNG, Sept. 1990, at 24 (discussing marketing strategies used by major
canners following implementation of dolphin safe policies).
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were worth the trouble.2 6 "Lowest-price" has been argued to be what
drives consumption of canned tuna in the U.S. market. That price
sensitivity caused marketing strategists of the new dolphin safe tuna to
question whether dolphin safe was a viable marketing method, and
whether consumers put aside concerns about dolphins when they hit the
grocery aisles. 127 One grocery merchandiser and buyer commented on the
dolphin safe marketing theme and its effect:
Tuna is a price item. If you run an ad for a two-for-a-dollar sale, I
don't think the consumers will ever question whether or not they
should buy the two-for-a-dollar ad item. I think if they were given
the same price, say, if everybody was 79 [cents] on tuna, then the
general public would be going toward the dolphin-safe tuna."'
Others felt that there was a percentage of consumers, those not buying
tuna because they were genuinely concerned about dolphin safety, who
might be brought back into the market by the dolphin safe label.' 29 In
support of this view, research by one of the major canners done prior to
the introduction of the label, showed that consumers strongly preferred the
new dolphin safe logo and that it enhanced the product's image. 30
In the months following the introduction of tuna labeled dolphin safe,
several merchants reported that they really hadn't seen an increase in
sales, despite carrying tuna with the dolphin safe label, and despite using
dolphin safe marketing in their ads.' Some merchants felt that confusion
over which tuna was dolphin safe contributed to an approximate three
percent sales decline, because some consumers just stopped buying tuna
126. Id. at 25. Mitch Meyers, vice-president of sales and marketing for the company
that handled the marketing of Chicken of the Sea tuna for Van Camp Seafood in the early
stages of the dolphin safe policy is quoted as having said, "[w]e are spending money on
marketing tactics that traditionally have not been used in this category, and we are paying
more for our product. Because the category is so competitive, we have not been able to pass
along the additional costs in the form of price increases." Id.
127. See id. (quoting Mitch Meyers, vice president of sales and marketing for company
which handled marketing of Chicken of the Sea tuna for Van Camp Seafood in early stages
of dolphin safe policy implementation).
128. See Gail Siragusa, Consumer Awareness Called Crucial to Dolphin Safe Tuna,
SUPERMARKET NEWS, Sept. 17, 1990, at 45 (quoting Jack Paulk, grocery merchandiser and
buyer for ABCO Markets' seventy-five Arizona stores).
129. Id.
130. Greg Johnson, Tuna Canners Send Buyers a Message with Dolphin Safe Labels,
L.A. TIMs, Nov. 20, 1990 at 2A.
131. See Siragusa, supra note 128.
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altogether."' In fact, a recent article reports that "in a poll conducted by
a major tuna processor, most of the consuming public appears to believe
that the dolphin safe label on a can of tuna means that dolphins are no
longer put in the can with the tuna.""'
D. Enforcement of Existing Labeling Provisions
Concerns were expressed by some environmental groups about the
enforceability of the labeling provisions."3 United States canners'
practices are certified dolphin safe by observers from either the NMFS or
the IATTC. 35 However, fears were expressed that there was no way to
be confident that the tuna being bought or the canneries being dealt with
were truly dolphin safe.'36 To address such concerns, Earthtrust, an
international wildlife preservation group based in Hawaii, launched its
own labeling scheme and verification program. It was designed to
establish global dolphin safe practices and utilized a label called the
"Flipper Seal of Approval." 37 Under the new program, some of the
canners voluntarily agreed to let their facilities and operations be
monitored by program representatives, whose mission was to
independently verify that processors were not buying tuna that were
caught by fishers using methods harmful to dolphins.1 31 In addition to
complying with program rules, participating canners were also expected
to help develop and fund educational programs designed to help protect
dolphin and marine ecosystems.1 39
132. Steve Weinstein, Why are Tuna Sales Soft?, PROGRESSiVE GROCER, Apr. 1991, at
145. Others, however, looked to the recession as a cause of sales declines. Id.
133. James P. Walsh, With the Tuna-Dolphin Controversy Expected to Resurface,
Congress Faces a Catch-22: Compliance with Gatt Provisions Could Infuriate the 'Green'
Lobby, NAT. L.J., June 12, 1995, at B6.
134. Anne Perry, Starkist Allows Monitoring of Dolphin-Safe Claims, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Nov. 14, 1991, at A-6. Don White, president of Earthtrust, an environmental
group that developed an independent monitoring program for the dolphin safe label, claimed
"[t]here was no legal meaning to the term dolphin-safe, it [meant] nothing at all." Id.
135. See 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(2) (1994) (covering observer coverage for ETP). See also
16 U.S.C. § 1417(d)(3)-(4) (1994) (covering observer coverage for WTP).
136. Perry, supra note 134. "Because of the complex and international nature of the
tuna industry, tuna canners can sell dolphin safe tuna in the United States but still export
tuna for sale overseas that doesn't meet U.S. standards." Id.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id
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Touted as "a structure for a new kind of extraterritorial accreditation
program'" intended to achieve the "highest standards in the world," 4' the
"Flipper Seal of Approval" program at the outset, did not see wide
participation. The Bumblebee Seafood Company expressed support for
dolphin safe fishing methods but claimed it was not going to participate in
the Flipper certification program because "it would cost tens of thousands
of dollars per year-money [he said] the environmental group requires to
pay for the group's own shipboard monitoring program, as well as for
fees."'42 Of the large canners, Starkist was the only one licensed by
Earthtrust, 43 and even it does not use the waving dolphin "Flipper Seal of
Approval" symbol on its label.
Currently, the Marine Mammal Protection Act requires that tuna
"harvested outside the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean by a purse seine
vessel, be accompanied by a written statement executed by the captain of
the vessel certifying that no purse seine net was intentionally deployed on
... dolphins during the particular voyage on which the tuna was harvest-
ed."'" However, according to the regulations implementing "dolphin
safe" tuna labeling, written certification and documentation through the
Fisheries Certificate of Origin are only required for tuna harvested in the
eastern tropical Pacific.'45 Thus, it seems that current programs to track
and verify tuna harvested outside the eastern tropical Pacific are
incomplete, inadequate, and unenforceable.
Furthermore, while the current regulations state that the: "Assistant
Administrator may request, in writing, any exporter, importer, processor,
distributor, or seller of any tuna or tuna product labeled... to produce,
within a specified time period, all documentary evidence concerning the
origin of any product that is offered as dolphin safe."'" NMFS has never
requested this information, nor has it conducted spot checks to verify the
documentation and the origin of any labeled product."' Without an
140. Steve Larue, Flipper Symbol to Wave from Dolphin-Safe Tuna Cans, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Nov. 18, 1991, at B3.
141. Id. (quoting Don White, CEO Earthtrust).
142. Id. (citing Michael McGowan, vice president of governmental affairs for Bumble-
bee Seafood).
143. Id.
144. 16 U.S.C. § 1417(d)(3) (1994).
145. 50 C.F.R. § 216.92 (1995).
146. Id.
147. Id.; Telephone Interview with Dana Wilkes, National Marine Fisheries Service,
Southwest Fisheries Center, Long Beach, Cal. (April, 1996).
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adequate tracking and verification system in place and a mechanism to
conduct periodic spot checks to determine compliance, consumers can
have no confidence in the dolphin safe label.
E. International Trade: Tuna Embargoes and the DPCIA
Beginning in 1990, U.S. courts ordered embargoes against various
harvesting nations that did not have dolphin conservation programs
comparable to those of the U.S. or which had average dolphin mortality
rates that exceeded those prescribed by U.S. law.1" Mexico's yellowfin
tuna catch was embargoed under the comparability provisions of the
MM.A.149 In accordance with the procedures of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 5' Mexico then challenged the United
States' embargo, the possible broadening of trade sanctions under the
Pelly Amendment,"' the intermediary nation embargoes, and the tuna
labeling provisions of the DPCIA, claiming that these were unfair trade
148. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990). In Earth
IslandInstitute, the district court ordered an interim embargo on August 28, 1990, enjoining
the importation of yellowfim tuna products until comparability findings were issued by
NMFS regarding foreign fishing fleets. The Secretary "ostensibly imposed the embargo" on
September 6, 1990. The next day, however, the Secretary issued an unwarranted
comparability finding for Mexico, based on NMFS's determination that Mexico was within
its dolphin kill limits for the first six months of 1990. Earth Island Institute asked the district
court for a temporary restraining order banning Mexican tuna imports on the grounds that
the comparability finding of September 7, 1990 violated the procedures established by the
MMPA. On October 4, 1990, the district court granted Earth Island Institute's request for
the temporary restraining order. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449, 1451 (9th
Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court). On October 19, 1990, the court, at the request of
the government, converted the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. Id.
at 1452. The district court granted a rehearing to resolve whether federal agencies had
obtained necessary certification that foreign nations were also prohibiting tuna barred from
importation into the United States. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826, 836
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (preliminary injunctive relief was still found appropriate).
149. See 56 Fed. Reg. 12,367-01 (1991). Recall that the comparability provisions under
the 1984 and 1988 amendments require a foreign nation exporting tuna to the United States
to document that it has adopted a dolphin conservation program equivalent to that of the
United States, and that the average rate of mortality of its purse seine fleet is comparable to
that of the U.S. fleet. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
150. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
151. See Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967,22 U.S.C. § 1978
(1994) (authorizing President to ban all fish products from any country whose policies
diminish the effectiveness of any international fisheries conservation program).
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practices.152 In September 1991, a dispute panel convened by the GATT
issued a preliminary report supporting Mexico's challenge.' 53
A separate challenge to the embargoes associated with the intermediary
nations was filed under GATT in 1992 by the European Community and
the Netherlands (acting on behalf of the Netherlands Antilles), claiming
that the intermediary embargo constituted an unfair trade practice.154 The
dispute panel proceedings were suspended to allow time for consultations
under the International Dolphin Conservation Act (IDCA), with hopes that
a resolution would ensue.'55 When the consultations failed to resolve the
dispute, the European Community and the Netherlands proceeded with
their challenge. In May 1994, the dispute panel issued a report supporting
152. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 99TH CONG., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
112(1993).
153. For a discussion of the GATT response to trade restrictions in the import of tuna
caught with purse seine net and the comparability standards of the MMPA, see Stephen
Fleischer, The Mexico-U.S. Tuna/Dolphin Dispute in GATT: Exploring the Use of Trade
Restrictions to Enforce Environmental Standards, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 515
(1993); Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, The Collision of the Environment and
Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 22 Envt. L. Rep. 10268 (1992); Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., Environment and Trade Measures After the TunaDolphin Decision, 49 WASH.
& LEEL. REV. 1221 (1992); Raul Pedrozo, The International Dolphin Conservation Act of
1992: Unreasonable Extension of US. Jurisdiction in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
Fishery, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 77 (1993); Thomas E. Skilton, GATT and the Environment in
Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute and the Quest for an International Conservation
Strategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455 (1993); Stanley M. Spracker & David C. Lundsgaard,
Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the
Environment, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 385 (1993).
154. The 1988 amendments to the MMPA require "the government of any intermediary
nation from which yellowfin tuna or tuna products will be exported to the United States to
certify and provide reasonable proof that it has acted to prohibit the importation of tuna and
tuna products from [embargoed nations]." The Marine Mammal Protection Act Amend-
ments of 1988, sec. 4, § 101(a)2, 102 Stat. 4755, 4765-4768 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. 1371(a)(2)(ii) (1994). In Earth Island Inst, v. Mosbacher, 785 F. Supp. 826 (N.D.
Cal. 1992), the court ruled on the meaning of the term "intermediary nation," which resulted
in a secondary embargo of tuna products from more than twenty intermediary nations. Id.
at 831. The court also ruled that it is insufficient for an intermediary nation to merely
demonstrate that it does not import, or has discontinued importing, tuna subject to a primary
embargo. Rather, the intermediary nation must show that it has acted to prohibit the
importation of the offending tuna and tuna products. Id. at 832.
155. Id. For more information on the second GATT dispute panel on tuna/dolphin, see
Steve Charnovitz, Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT Panel Report, 24
ENVTL. L. REP. 10567 (1994); Paul J. Yechout, Note, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibi-
lities for GATT-Complaint Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247 (1996).
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the European Community's challenge. 5 6 Neither panel ruling has yet
been considered for adoption by the parties to the GATT. 57
F The International Dolphin Conservation Program Act
In 1992, Congress again revisited the "legislated" general permit in the
International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992.58 The impetus for the
IDCA was to resolve the GATT trade issue of whether it was appropriate
for a member nation to unilaterally impose its domestic conservation
policies on other states by implementing embargoes."5 9 Although Mexico
did not bring the issue to the full GATT council for formal adoption, the
panel decision called into question whether the MMPA's embargo
provision could be used effectively to control foreign kill levels."6 With
GATT's decision coming down against U.S. use of embargoes in this
field, it became clear that the United States had to work toward a
multi-national approach to reducing dolphin deaths in foreign tuna
fisheries.
In an effort to craft a mechanism that was compatible with international
practice and still reach the goals of the MMPA and the DPCIA, the IDCA
authorized the Secretary of State to enter into international agreements to
establish a global moratorium (of at least five years duration) on the
intentional encirclement of dolphins with purse seine nets during tuna
fishing operations.161 The Act also amended the MMPA to limit the total
number of dolphin mortalities in the U.S. fleet under the Act's permit
to 1,000 for 1992 and 800 for 1993 and the first three months of 1994.63
On March 1, 1994, the general permit for the U.S. fleet was to expire,
provided that at least some countries entered into an agreement
156. See generally GATT: Dispute Settlement Panel, Report on United States
Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
157. See Yechout, supra note 155, at 259 n.80 (citing Mexico's failure to press for
adoption of panel report). GATT panel decisions are not automatically binding. Id. at 269.
158. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1994).
159. See H.R. REP. No. 102-746, 11 (1992) (citing administration proposal aimed at
promoting international dolphin protection and resolving GATT trade issue).
160. See supra notes 148-157 and accompanying text (discussing GATT dispute panels).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1994).
162. The issuance of the general permit essentially modified the quota to reflect the
decline in the number of U.S. vessels fishing for tuna by setting on dolphin, which was
brought about by the cannery ban. See MARINE MAMMAL COMMSsION, 1992 ANNuAL
REPORTTO CONGRESS 99-100 (1993).
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(1) (1994).
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establishing the moratorium. In the absence of a moratorium, the permit
would remain in effect until the end of 1999, subject to declining quotas
each year. 16'
Other provisions in the IDCA called for international research programs
to develop alternative fishing practices, 165 trade restrictions on non-dolphin
safe tuna, 166 observers on all purse seine vessels, 67 and among other
things, annual reports to Congress to report on research, economic
impacts, and the impacts on dolphins, tuna, and other marine life from the
fishery. 161
Some thought the 1992 MMPA amendments offered new hope for
resolving the foreign dolphin mortality problem through the international
moratorium. 169 By relying on direct negotiations, the moratorium would
avoid the problem of a forced embargo, thereby raising questions of
GATT consistency. 70 The moratorium would clearly "level the playing
field" between U.S. and foreign tuna fleets. If joined by enough countries
and adequately enforced, it would virtually eliminate the take of dolphins
in purse seine operations for tuna.' 7 ' Although some of the foreign
nations involved in the ETP fishery initially endorsed the concept,"m no
tuna-fishing nation committed to the global moratorium after passage of
the IDCA. Moreover, under the Clinton administration, the State
Department has not actively pursued negotiations to secure commitments
from foreign tuna-fishing nations to adhere to the global moratorium.
Consequently, the IDCA by itself has failed to encourage a multilateral
solution among ETP fishing nations. Without international commitment
164. Id. § 1416(a)(3)-(4)(D).
165. Id. § 1413(a).
166. Id. § 1417(a)(1).
167. Id. § 1415(a)(2).
168. Id. § 1414.
169. H.R. REP. No. 102-746, at 6 (1992) (discussing legislation intended to establish
international moratorium on encirclement on dolphins for harvesting tuna).
170. Id. See also, Yechout, supra note 155, at 261. "The Act [IDCA] nevertheless
represents a significant effort by the United States toward resolution of the GATT problems
through the use of multilateral agreements." Id.
171. Hearing on Bush Administration's 3/3/92 Tuna/Dolphin Proposal before the
Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., (1992) (statement of John M.
Fitzgerald, Counsel for Wildlife Policy, Defenders of Wildlife) (stating that Administration
proposal limiting moratorium to five years would eliminate opportunity to achieve
permanent end to practice of setting nets on dolphins by both U.S. and foreign fleets).
172. Id.
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to a global moratorium, many provisions of the IDCA are, as a practical
matter, ineffective. 73
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS To REDUCE DOLPHIN MORTALITY
A. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and
the La Jolla Agreement
In 1979, the IATTC 74 began its international observer programs,
placing observers on both foreign and domestic vessels. 75 The observer
program was perhaps the single most important factor leading to fleet-
wide dolphin mortality reductions. Reports demonstrate that dolphin
mortality was significantly higher on vessels not carrying observers than
on vessels where observers were present. 176
The IATTC has been responsible for working with member nations"
to implement the requirements of the comparability program since 1988.78
The Commission is the source of foreign dolphin mortality data for the
ETP.79 The IATTC has also taken charge of the further research suggest-
173. Tuna/Dolphin Issues: Hearings on the Provisions of the International Dolphin
Conservation Act, How it is Affecting Dolphin Mortality, and What Measures Can Be
Effected to Keep the Mortality to a Minimum and on H.R. 2823 Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 1st & 2d
Sess. 64 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Suzanne Iudicello, Vice President for
Programs, Center for Marine Conservation, made on behalf of the Environmental Defense
Fund, Greenpeace, National Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation, Whale and
Dolphin Conservation Society, and World Wildlife Fund).
174. Convention for the Establishment of Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,
May 31, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 230. See id. IATTC, the one international agreement that most
tuna catching nations have endorsed, was developed under the auspices of the Convention
for the Establishment of Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. The IATTC was
established for the purpose of providing maximum yield of tunas and tuna-like fishes in the
ETP on a sustained basis. In 1976, the IATrC established the goals of"maintain[ing] a high
level of tuna production... and maintain[ing] porpoise stocks at or above levels that assure
their survival in perpetuity, with every reasonable effort being made to avoid needless or
careless killing of porpoise." IATTC, 1979 ANUAL REPORT 51 (1981).
175. 54 Fed. Reg. 20,171 (1989).
176. 55 Fed. Reg. 42,235 (1990).
177. The membership of the IATrC consists of nations that either fish for, or purchase
large quantities of ETP-tuna: United States, France, Japan, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica,
Nicaragua, and Vanuatu. A number of nations involved in the ETP fishery are not IATTC
members, including Mexico. Yechout, supra note 155.
178. See 56 Fed. Reg. 47,418 (1991); 53 Fed. Reg. 8910, 8913-16 (1988).
179. See 54 Fed. Reg. 20,171 (1989).
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ed by the NRC study, such as testing fish aggregating devices (FADs)," °
research on catching tuna under logs and in schools, and assessment of
both tuna and dolphin populations. 8' Because of increased public scrutiny
and U.S. embargoes on member nations, the IATTC has accelerated its
program to reduce incidental dolphin mortality.
The 1984 and 1988 amendments to the MMPA resulted in the embargo
of tuna from several of the foreign tuna fishing nations. The passage of
the DPCIA provided a strong impetus for the foreign fleets to take action
to reduce dolphin mortality which, during the time that the DPCIA was
implemented, ranged from 84,000 animals in 1989, to 47,000 in 1990. 11
On June 18, 1992, IATTC adopted the La Jolla Agreement, a non-
binding multilateral program designed to reduce dolphin mortalities in the
ETP over a seven-year period to "levels approaching zero," while
maintaining the present maximum tuna yield. " In addition to the member
nations (the United States, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
and Vanuatu), four non-member nations that fish in the ETP ratified the
agreement (Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and Spain). Two member
nations (France and Japan) did not ratify the agreement."
The La Jolla Agreement encourages limiting dolphin mortalities in the
ETP tuna fishery, from 19,500 mortalities in 1993 to fewer than 5,000
annual mortalities by 1999."'s It also requires that these limits be assigned
on a per-vessel basis,"8 and that a vessel cease fishing when it reaches its
180. Fish-Aggregating Devices, or FADs, are anchored or drifting artificial objects
deliberately placed to attract tuna, and are used as an alternative to dolphin-associated
fishing. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 93. "Purse seiners catch substantial amounts of
tuna every year by setting nets on floating objects, but no one knows why tuna associate with
floating objects or how strong or long-lasting the attraction is." Id. While catches using
FADs can be large, the size of the tuna, on average, is smaller than the catches in dolphin
sets. Id. The fundamental question pertaining to the testing and developments of FADs is
"whether it is possible to develop FADs capable of attracting large yellowfin" in the ETP.
Id. at 94. See generally, id., at 93-98 (discussing history, status, and potential for use of
FADs in ETP ocean).
181. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Listing of Eastern Spinner Dolphin
as a Threatened Species, 57 Fed. Reg. 47,620, 47,625 (1992) (Proposed Oct. 10, 1992).
182. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 95 (1992).
183. Agreement to Reduce Dolphin Mortality in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, reprinted in
33 I.L.M. 936 (1992) [hereinafter La Jolla Agreement].
184. Id.
185. The subsequent schedule for mortality limits are: 1994-15,500; 1995-12,000;
1996-9,000; 1997-7,500; 1998-6,500; 1999- fewer than 5,000. See id.
186. The La Jolla Agreement calls for a listing of all purse-seine vessels with a carrying
capacity of over 400 short tons. These vessels are then assigned Dolphin Mortality Limits
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limit of dolphin deaths. The Agreement further establishes an
international research program and scientific advisory board"' to
coordinate, facilitate, and guide research directed at reducing dolphin
mortalities. Additionally, it requires that observers accompany all purse
seine vessels (exceeding a carrying capacity of 400 short tons).188 Finally,
it organizes an international review panel to monitor compliance by the
international fleet with the annual dolphin mortality limits. 189
The success of the La Jolla Agreement can be traced to the International
Review Panel and the Dolphin Mortality Limits. The International
Review Panel, composed of five government representatives, two
representatives of environmental organizations, and two representatives
of the tuna fishing industry, reviews observer data to monitor compliance
with the La Jolla Agreement.' 90 This Review Panel establishes the DMLs
each year, along with protective measures for individual dolphin stocks
ensuring their survival, and recommends actions to be taken by
governments to ensure compliance with the resolutions.19 '
The International Dolphin Conservation Program established under the
La Jolla Agreement and implemented by the IATTC has been extremely
effective. In 1993, the first year of the program, dolphin mortality for the
international fleet was reduced to only 3,601 animals, almost 12,000
animals fewer than the 1992 mortality levels and well below the 1999
dolphin mortality target of 5,000 animals."9 The program experienced
similar success in 1994, with dolphin mortality at 4,095 animals, 93 in
(DML). For example, in 1993, each DML would be equivalent to 19,500 divided by the
total number of qualified vessels with an adjustment limit permitted for each nation. Any
vessel reaching its DML is required to halt further fishing on dolphins in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean and any vessel exceeding its DML for a given year will have the exceeded amount
deducted from its assigned DML for the next year. See id. at 938-39.
187. Under the La Jolla Agreement, the responsibilities of the scientific advisory board
are to monitor the status of both dolphin and tuna populations and to conduct research into
various "dolphin safe" fishing procedures. Id. at 942.
188. According to the La Jolla Agreement, an observer must be on board to ensure the
DML is not exceeded and at least fifty percent of these observers are to be trained by the
IAT1C. Id at 939.
189. d at 938.
190. Id at 938-41.
191. d at 940.
192. MARINE MAMMAL CoMivssioN, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 116-25
(1995).
193. MARiNEMAMMAL COMMISSiON, 1995ANNuAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 100 (1996).
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1995 with a mortality of 3,274'14 and 1996 with a mortality fewer than
2,700 dolphins. 95 The successful reduction in mortality rates is due to
international cooperation by IATTC members and the development of
fishing practices, pioneered by U.S. captains, which reduce dolphin
mortalities. It is likely that the ETP purse seine fishery will be able to
achieve further reductions through improved technology that avoids
disaster sets.' 96 In fact, some believe that dolphin deaths may at some
point in the near future number fewer than 1,000 a year.1
9 7
V. THE GENESIS OF THE PANAMA DECLARATION
A. A Necessary Change of Course:
Reasons for the Panama Declaration
While substantial progress has been made under the MMPA and the La
Jolla Agreement, more is needed to be done to further reduce and
eventually eliminate dolphin mortality, and to ensure the health and
stability of the ETP marine ecosystem. Action to strengthen the inter-
national dolphin protection regime was necessary as subsequent events,
explored in depth below, threatened to undermine or undo all of the
progress made to date on the tuna/dolphin issue.
1. International Commitments to the La Jolla Agreement Were in
Jeopardy
The political durability of the voluntary legal agreement was in question
as foreign tuna fishing nations were making preparations to abandon the
194. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1997).
195. Id. The number 2,700 was a preliminary estimate in this report.
196. The term "disaster sets" or special problem sets refers to a set in which:
(a) the mortality exceeds 50% of the individual-vessel DML for 1994 and affects that
vessel's DML for 1995;
(b) the mortality is not caused by or contributed to by: an infraction committed by the
fishing captain, or a gear failure or malfunction resulting from a lack of proper
maintenance of the vessel and its gear ....
See Agreement for the Conservation of Dolphins Summary Documentation of Decisions and
Recommendations of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Intergovernmental
Plenary and International Review Panel, April 1992 - Jan. 1995, app. 21, 25 (1995)
[hereinafter IATTC Dolphin Summary].
197. Personal communication with Martin Hall, Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (on file with Authors).
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commitments of the La Jolla Agreement and opt for a less restrictive
multilateral agreement.19
By 1995, the tuna fishery in the ETP was no longer dominated by U.S.
vessels; it had become an international fishery that required international
management.' 99 Further modifications would be needed in order to
achieve greater reductions in dolphin mortality, especially in light of the
fact that the La Jolla Agreement mortality schedule, in its current non-
binding form, only extended to 1999.m
The success of the La Jolla Agreement was due largely to the good faith
efforts of the fishing nations participating in the agreement. 2°' In 1995,
all of the Latin American nations that fish for yellowfin tuna in the ETP
were embargoed under section 101 of the MMPA.Y As of June 1, 1994,
the dolphin safe market access provision of Title I of the MMPA closed
access to all tuna that was not dolphin safe.2°3 Even if a sizeable portion
of a foreign nation's fleet was fishing in a manner considered dolphin
safe, the encirclement of even one dolphin by that foreign nation's fleet
fishing in the ETP was grounds for an embargo under the Act's
comparability standards.' 4 Under the regime a large portion of dolphin
safe tuna from the ETP were nevertheless barred from the U.S. market.
198. San Jose Declaration at the Intergovernmental Meeting of the La Jolla Agreement,
July 14, 1995 (Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela) [a copy of this declaration is
on file with the Ocean and Costal Law Journal] [hereinafter San Jose Declaration].
199. In 1995, the U.S. fleet had five purse seine vessels fishing in the ETP, while the
foreign fleets had 95 vessels. MARINE MAMMAL CO msslON, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 102 (1996).
200. See La Jolla Agreement, supra note 183, at 938 (outlining mortality schedule).
201. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 45 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D., Director,
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission). See also, H.R. REP. No. 746, supra note 168,
at 324 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D., Director, Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission).
202. See 56 Fed. Reg. 12,367 (1993) (embargoing Mexican tuna); 56 Fed. Reg. 21,096
(1991) (embargoing Venezuelan tuna); 58 Fed. Reg. 3013 (1993) (embargoing Panamanian
tuna); 59 Fed. Reg. 65,974 (1994) (embargoing Columbian and Vanuatuan tuna).
203. 16 U.S.C. § 1417(a)(1) (1994).
204. Prohibited from making sets on three of the ten stocks of eastern tropical Paci-
fic dolphins, faced with a quota of 105 dolphins, and foreclosed from marketing in the
United States any tuna caught by setting on dolphins, none of the five U.S. vessels
remaining in the eastern tropical Pacific fishery initially requested a dolphin mortality
quota for 1995 ... no sets on dolphins were made and no dolphins were killed by the
U.S. fleet in 1995.
MARINE MAMMAL COMMIssION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 101 (1996).
Therefore, according to 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II), the mortality rate for the foreign
fleet also had to be zero (0 x 1.25).
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The net effect of these policies was to cause a shift in the canned tuna
market. For example, in the mid-1970s, the United States consumed
about eighty-five percent of the yellowfin tuna caught in the ETP. By the
end of 1992, that percentage had declined to less than ten percent.'
Much of the catch from the ETP was sold to Europe, the second largest
market, and to Latin America, with Mexico increasing its tuna
consumption fivefold between 1975 and 1992.06 Because these nations
were developing markets for their tuna outside the United States, access
to the U.S. markets no longer provided incentive for these nations to
achieve further dolphin mortality reductions.07
The end result was a growing discontent among Latin American nations
over the inconsistencies between the MMPA and the U.S. embargo
provisions, on the one hand, and U.S. support of the La Jolla Agreement
on the other.208 These countries began to make threats to abandon the
existing La Jolla Agreement in favor of a less restrictive regime.20 9 This
culminated with the governments of Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela signing the San Jose Declaration at the
Intergovernmental Meeting of the La Jolla Agreement in Costa Rica on
July 14, 1995.2'0 It stated specifically that the nations wished to:
Reiterate their concern that the stability of the La Jolla Agreement is
endangered if the United States fails during this Session of the U.S.
205. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 117 (1995).
206. Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 173, at 305 (statement of Timothy E. Wirth,
Under Secretary for Global Affairs, U.S. Department of State) (discussing world market for
canned tuna).
207. Id. at 304.
The fact is, Mr. Chairman, that after three years of adhering to the MMPA's current
stringent dolphin protection program and seeing no prospect of relief in terms of
access to the U.S. market, the foreign fleets and governments do not have a strong
incentive to continue pursuing an effective compliance and penalty regime, and the
United States has little leverage.
Id.
208. Atthe June 13-15, 1995 meeting of the IATTIC, six nations-Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela--issued a joint statement urging the United States
to lift the primary and intermediary tuna embargoes and alleging that U.S. embargoes of tuna
that is not dolphin-safe are contrary to international law, lack a scientific basis, are
counterproductive to broader conservation goals, and are incompatible with the United
States signing the La Jolla Agreement. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1995 ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 103 (1996).
209. Id. at 103-04.
210. See San Jose Declaration, supra note 198.
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Congress to resolve these U.S. policy inconsistencies by
implementing the following three indivisible acts: lifting of the
primary and secondary embargoes; codifying the La Jolla
Agreement; and redefining "dolphin safe" to include all tuna and tuna
products harvested in accord with the regulatory measures embodied
within the framework of the La Jolla Agreement.211
Many of these countries were also investigating other international
management bodies and mechanisms such as Organizagion Latinamericana
de Desarrollo Pesquero that could be substituted for the La Jolla
Agreement." Given the concern expressed by these nations, the
conclusion was inescapable. If nations abandoned the La Jolla
Agreement, dolphin mortality would increase and the management of the
fishery would suffer.213
2. The 'Dolphin Safe" Policy Did Not End the Practice of Setting on
Dolphin and Current Dolphin Safe Fishing Practices Have a
Substantial Bycatch of Other Marine Species in the ETP
The "dolphin safe" policy did not achieve all of its goals, and data taken
from IATTC observers indicated that "dolphin safe" fishing practices have
a greater bycatch-including deaths of vulnerable marine species such as
sharks, sea turtles, and billfish-associated with these fishing methods. 4
211. Id. at2.
212. Article 3 in the Statement of the Conference of Ministers on Article 14 of the
Articles of Agreement of the Organizagion Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Pesquero. The
Organizagion Latinoamericana de Desarrollo Pesquero includes fishery representatives from
Latin America and Caribbean and includes: Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
213. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 51 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D.. Director,
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission) (discussing the merits of the La Jolla Agreement
and its success); id. at 295-96 (statement by Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global
Affairs, U.S. Department of State) (discussing success of fishery management under La Jolla
Agreement); id. at 41 (statement of Ambassador David A. Colson, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Oceans in the Bureau of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of State) (suggesting that loss of the IATTC program would be a step backward for
dolphin protection).
214. See generally INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, 1995 PEER REVmW
OF THE IATTC BYCATCH DATA BASE 13 [hereinafter IATTC Bycatch Database Peer
Review].
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Despite the dramatic progress made under the MMPA, dolphins have
continued to die in the ETP. At the individual species or stock level the
fishery has not met the MMPA's zero mortality goal. 215 Although Cong-
ress recognized that dolphin mortality was the driving force for the
DPCIA, the stated goal of the DPCIA was to end the practice of
intentionally deploying nets to encircle dolphins.216 In adopting the
DPCIA, however, Congress recognized that "[a] major obstacle to such
a change [(the end of encirclement)] has been the difficulty of imposing
it [(the DPCIA)] upon the fishing fleets of nations other than the United
States., 217  Unfortunately, the DPCIA did little to change the fishing
practices of international fishers in the ETP. Fishers continued to encircle
dolphins at approximately the same rate as before 1990.218 In fact, as a
percentage of total sets, sets made on dolphins represented fifty-two
percent of the total sets made between 1980 and 1990, and about fifty-four
percent between 1990 and 1995.219
On the other hand, although the relative rate of sets made on dolphins
did not decrease significantly after the passage of the DPCIA, dolphin
mortality per set did decrease from 5.0 in 1990 to 0.46 in 1995.M
Moreover, the percentage of sets that involved no dolphin mortality
increased from fifty-four percent to eighty-five percent during that same
215. The great majority of independent and government marine mammal scientists
consider mortality levels of less than 0.1% of the minimum population size for a dolphin
stocks to have a "negligible impact" on the dolphin stocks and to meet the MMPA's zero
mortality rate goal. See National Marine Fisheries Service, Office of Protected Resources,
1994 Report of the PBR (Potential Biological Removal) Workshop. See also 50 C.F.R. §
228.3 (1996) (definition of "negligible impact").
216. H.R. REP. No. 101-579, at 5 (1990).
217. Id.
218. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 325 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D. Director,
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission).
219. M.A. Hall & S.D. Boyer, Estimates of Incidental Mortality of Dolphins in the
Purse-Seine Fishery for Tunas in the Eastern Pacific Ocean in 1990, 42 REP. INT'L
WHALING COMM'N. 529 (1992); see also Personal Comments of Martin Hall, Inter-Ameri-
can Tropical Tuna Commission (estimating 1995 dolphin set data) (on file with Authors).
220. Hall & Boyer, supra note 219, at 530.
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time period. 1  Both of these measures demonstrate that fishersm are
releasing greater numbers of dolphins.
Hence, the DPCIA did not eliminate or ban the practice of
encirclement. Fishers continue to set on dolphins in the ETP. The
MMPA and the DPCIA were, however, influential in achieving the
substantial dolphin mortality decrease in the ETP.
Not surprisingly, since the passage of the DPCIA, consumers have
become confused as to the exact definition of "dolphin safe." Some are
under the false impression that dolphins are no longer encircled or
drowned in tuna nets in the ETPm In truth, the dolphin-safe label never
guaranteed that no dolphins would be killed by tuna fishermen. In fact,
under current law, fishing methods deemed dolphin-safe such as school
and log sets? could still result in dolphin deaths and the tuna caught could
still be labeled "dolphin safe."'
Besides causing some dolphin deaths, recent data indicate other serious
problems may result from using fishing methods that do not involve
setting nets around dolphins. For example, setting nets on logs and
floating objects or on schools of juvenile tuna, may involve substantial
bycatches of non-target species and juvenile tuna.' Specifically, log sets
result in 100 times more juvenile tuna bycatch than dolphin sets and
school sets result in ten times more juvenile tuna bycatch than dolphin
221. Id
222. These were primarily Latin American fishers. In response to the DPCIA, the U.S.
fleet moved to the western Pacific to fish for tuna not in association with dolphins and the
major canneries all but stopped purchasing tuna from the ETP. H.R. REP. No. 101-579, at
6-7 (1990); see also, MARNE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
117 (1995).
223. See supra section III.C, and notes 116-128 and accompanying text (describing
consumer reaction to introduction of dolphin safe label).
224. There are three methods of fishing for tuna with purse seines: setting on or
encircling dolphins, logs (floating objects and debris), and schoolfish (schools of tuna not
associated with dolphins). The latter two methods, because they do not involve intentionally
encircling a school of dolphins to capture tuna, are considered "dolphin safe" under the
DPCIA. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 37.
225. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 69 (statement of Suzanne Iudicello, Vice President
for Programs, Center for Marine Conservation); id. at 317-18 (statement of Elizabeth
Edwards, Ph.D., Leader, Dolphin Safe Research Program, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service,
Southwest Fisheries Science Center) (discussing the bycatch of other marine life in "dolphin
safe" sets).
226. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 317-18 (statement of Elizabeth Edwards, Ph.D.,
Leader, Dolphin Safe Research Program, National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest
Fisheries Science Center).
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school sets result in ten times more juvenile tuna bycatch than dolphin
sets. These rates are similar for the bycatch of other marine species.'
Of particular concern are species that reproduce slower than other species
such as sharks, billfish, and sea turtles." Since the latter part of 1992,
the IATTC has been using observers to collect data on the species and
number of animals captured by vessels with capacities greater than 400
tons. 9 These data, which constitute one of the largest and most complete
bycatch data sets in the world, provide the basis for examining the
quantities and types of animals taken by the various fishing methods.20
There is also growing concern about the discard of dead juvenile
tuna.3' Data collected by the IATTC during 1993 and 1994 indicate that
the average tons of juvenile yellowfin tuna discarded per set for dolphin,
schoolfish, and log sets was 0.17, 0.58, and 8.3 tons respectively. 2
These estimated average weights of discarded juvenile yellowfm tuna
reasonably correspond to those estimated by NMFS of 0.06 tons per set
on dolphins, 1.0 to 1.2 tons per set on schoolfish, and 7.0 to 15.0 tons per
set on logs, with variations depending on the geographic area. 3 Further,
the IATTC estimates that, overall, 7.4% or 31,660 tons of all species of
227. Id. at 318 (statement of Elizabeth Edwards, Ph.D., Leader, Dolphin Safe Research
Program, National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries Science Center); see also
Hall & Boyer, supra note 219.
228. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 318-19 (statement of Elizabeth Edwards, Ph.D.,
Leader, Dolphin Safe Research Program, National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest
Fisheries Science Center); see also response of James Joseph, Ph.D., Director, Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission to questions from Congressman Jim Saxton, April
1996 (on record at the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans).
229. IATTC Bycatch Database Peer Review, supra note 214, at 6.
230. Id. at 13.
231. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 317-19 (statement of Elizabeth Edwards, Ph.D.,
Leader, Dolphin Safe Research Program, National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest
Fisheries Science Center); id. at 326 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D., Director, Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission).
232. MARTIN A. HALL ET AL., INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMM'N, THE
ASSOCIATION OF TUNAS WITH FLOATING OBJECTS AND DOLPHINS IN THE EASTERN TROPICAL
PACIFIC OCEAN II: THE PURSE-SEINE FISHERY FOR TUNAS IN THE EASTERN TROPICAL
PACIFIC OCEAN (1992); see also, Elizabeth F. Edwards & Peter C. Perkins, SOUTHwEST
FISHERIES SCIENCE CENTER, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, ESTIMATED TUNA
DISCARD FROM DOLPHIN, SCHOOL, AND LOG SET IN THE EASTERN TROPICAL PACIFIC OCEAN
1989-1992 (forthcoming date) (draft on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
233. SOUTHWEST FISHERIEs SCIENCE CENTER, NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE,
ADMIN. REP. L.J. 94-05, DIRECTOR'S REPORT TO THE 45TH TUNA CONFERENCE ON TUNA AND
TUNA-RELATED ACTVITIES AT THE SOUTHwEsT FISHERIES SCIENCE CENTER FOR THE PERIOD
MAY 1, 1993 TO APRIL 30, 1994.
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tuna caught in the fishery during 1993 and 1994 were discarded. 4
According to IATTC reports for 1993 and 1994, the total tons of
yellowfin tuna discarded by the international fleet ranged from 448 to 916
tons from dolphin sets, 606 to 2,108 tons from school sets, and 3,802 to
4,150 from log sets. 5
These data leave no doubt that action is necessary, not only to reduce
dolphin mortality, but also to reduce overall bycatch of other species in
the fishery and to avert a large-scale shift to log and school sets.2 6
Indeed, a scientific peer review of the IATTC bycatch data found:
[T]hat the various bycatch summaries allowed it to conclude that
substantial differences in discard levels occurred for different set
types [(log, school, and dolphin sets)]. On the other hand, the peer
group did not believe there were adequate data or statistical analyses
provided to estimate the degree of these differences.
Nevertheless, the sheer magnitude of the rate differences by set type
makes it difficult to dismiss the conclusion that a major shift in the
proportion of each set category would likely lead to substantial
differences in levels and species compositions of the bycatches and
size categories of harvested target species. Based on the findings of
the peer review panel, it would be prudent that any proposed major
shifts in fishing modes take into account the implied ecological
impacts.23
7
While the peer review could not ascertain the overall quantitative
impact, or the impact of shifts to school or log sets on a particular species,
the data qualitatively indicated that current "dolphin safe" fishing methods
(school and log sets) resulted in far greater bycatch.2 s Moreover, any
shift of fishing effort to these methods that may be caused by statutory
requirements to end the encirclement of dolphins would likely result in
greater bycatch of vulnerable marine species, including sea turtles already
in danger of extinction. 9
234. INTER-AMERicAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, QUARTERLY REPORT-THIRD
QUARTER 30, table 10 (1995).
235. Id
236. See supra note 224 (reviewing tuna fishing methods).
237. IATTC Bycatch Database Peer Review, supra note 213, at 14.
238. Id
239. Id.
19971
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Some environmental groups maintain that the bycatch in the fishery was
probably greater in the late 1970s and early 1980s when the fishery was
larger. They also maintain that there is no clear assessment available as
to the impact on the fishery of the current rates of the discards of juvenile
tuna.' Nevertheless, it is clear that bycatch was a substantial problem.
In light of domestic and international efforts to assess and reduce bycatch
and improve fishery management, the precautionary approach2U would
reduce this waste, conserve tuna stocks, and avoid any increase in bycatch
because of a shift in the fishing methods. This could be achieved by
allowing the fishery to operate within its existing proportion of log,
school, and dolphin sets, while requiring bycatch reduction measures for
dolphin target, and non-target bycatch. 42
3. Congressional Attacks on the MMPA
Congress considered legislation that would change the MMPA and
significantly undermine dolphin protection.u3 On August 3, 1995,
Representative Randy "Duke" Cunningham of California introduced H.R.
2179, The International Dolphin Conservation Act Amendments of
1995.24 As introduced, H.R. 2179 was an open attack on the MMPA and
international efforts to reduce dolphin mortality in the ETP purse seine
fishery for yellowfin tuna.
The Cunningham bill proposed broad changes to existing tuna-dolphin
legislation. First, the Cunningham bill would have repealed the existing
comparability requirements for nations seeking to export tuna to the
240. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 381 (statement of Jeffrey Pike, Dolphin Safe Fair
Trade Campaign).
241. The "precautionary approach," or precautionary principle, has developed in
international environmental law in recognition of the need to act to protect the environment
in the absence of scientific certainty about future harm. The Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development states, "[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary
approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation." Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, Jun. 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 784, 879 (1992).
242. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 319 (statement of Elizabeth Edwards, Ph.D.,
Leader, Dolphin Safe Research Program, National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest
Fisheries Science Center).
243. See H.R. 2179, 104th Cong. (1995).
244. Id.
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United States. 45 Under the proposed legislation, comparability would
have been based on a requirement that a nation seeking to export tuna to
the United States must have participated in the international program
established under the La Jolla Agreement, provided that: (1) dolphin
mortality under the program was within the potential biological removal
level' for each affected stock, (2) all vessels of the nation were partici-
pating in the program and were subject to 100% observer coverage, (3)
the nation authorized the release of information sufficient to demonstrate
participation in the program, and (4) the nation complied with all
reasonable requests to participate in cooperative scientific research.247
Second, the provisions regarding the general permit issued to the
American Tunaboat Association would have been deleted and replaced
with a requirement subjecting U.S. purse seine vessels in the ETP to
regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce that were
consistent with, and implemented, the International Dolphin Program.2'
Finally, the Cunningham bill would have repealed the DPCIA, along with
the definition of dolphin safe tuna and the existing provision that limits
imports to dolphin safe tuna. 4
Conservation groups strongly opposed H.R. 2179 for several reasons.
First, H.R. 2179 would have more than doubled the number of dolphin
deaths and led to declines in tuna stocks in the ETP tuna fisheryY0
Second, H.R. 2179 would not have served the economic interests of the
United States through the creation of new jobs, and there was no evidence
that it would return significant economic benefits either to the American
tuna fishery (especially those vessels fishing in the Western Pacific) or the
245. Id § 5.
246. The term "potential biological removal level" means:
the maximum number of animals, not including natural mortalities, that may be
removed from a marine mammal stock while allowing that stock to reach or maintain
its optimum sustainable population. The potential biological removal level is the
product of the following factors: (A) The minimum population estimate of the stock;
(B) One-half the maximum theoretical or estimated net productivity rate of the stock
at a small population size; (C) A recovery factor of between 0.1 and 1.0.
16 U.S.C. § 1362(20) (1994).
247. H.R. 2179, 104th Cong. § 5 (1995).
248. Ie § 6 (1995).
249. Id. § 5 (1995).
250. CENTER FOR MARINE CONSERVATION, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND,
GREENPEACE, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, A STATEMENT FOR
THE RECORD ON H.R. 2179---INTERNATIONAL DOLPHIN CONSERVATION AcT AMENDMENTS
OF 1995." August 1995 (on file with Authors).
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major tuna canners."' Third, by ignoring the need for a multilateral inter-
national solution, H.R. 2179 would have undermined the possibility for
further progress in international dolphin and tuna conservation and
bycatch reduction through efforts to strengthen the IATTC and the La
Jolla Agreement.2
The United States took legislative action in the past, hoping to catalyze
a multilateral solution to the tuna-dolphin problem. As a consequence of
this policy, progress has been made towards the establishment of an
effective international regime, and this progress has caused a sharp
reduction in the level of dolphin mortality. However, the political
durability of the current unilateral approach is in question. There is also
early evidence that certain bycatch of other species may be exacerbated
if U.S. law causes a widespread shift to fishing methods currently labeled
dolphin safe (setting on logs and schoolfish). The solutions to these
problems cannot be reached by amending U.S. law. In light of the overall
success of the U.S. and international programs, it has become evident that
the time is ripe to craft a lasting solution to the tuna/dolphin problem.
Such a solution should address the needs for a binding multilateral resolu-
tion, strengthening of international conservation and management of tuna
and dolphin stocks, and establishment of conservation and management
measures to protect marine ecosystems and biological diversity.
B. Necessary Components For Lasting Resolution of The
Tuna/Dolphin Problem
The tuna/dolphin problem will require a comprehensive approach as
well as the active participation and commitment of all stakeholders-both
international and domestic. 3 At a minimum, any multilateral solution
must: (1) establish mechanisms to conserve the ecosystem and marine
biological diversity in the ETP, (2) strengthen international conservation
and management of tuna and dolphin stocks, (3) create a binding
international agreement to conserve dolphins and (4) maintain consumer
confidence in the "dolphin safe" label. 4
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 65.
254. Id.
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Despite the striking success of the La Jolla Agreement, it remains only
a non-binding resolution. 5 In its testimony opposing the Cunningham
bill, the Center for Marine Conservation (CMC) recommended that
member nations of the IATTC Convention and the La Jolla Agreement
undertake actions to ensure that any subsequent revision of the La Jolla
Agreement makes it a legally binding protocol and that the Convention,
itself, is strengthened to be a truly effective, long-term, conservation and
management tool for the ETP marine ecosystem. 6 Additionally, the
CMC strongly recommended that all nations fishing in the ETP be
required to be members of the IATTC.5
The future success of the La Jolla Agreement requires that the
signatories to this agreement revisit the Agreement as a whole, especially
the dolphin mortality reduction schedule.58 For the past two years, the
parties who participated in the intergovernmental body of the IATTC with
oversight responsibility for the La Jolla Agreement have failed to lower
the dolphin mortality limits to be more in line to reflect the actual
mortality in the fishery and to provide incentives for further progress in
reducing dolphin mortality in the future. 9 Additionally, any revised
agreement should afford greater protection to individual stocks of dolphins
that are primary targets of the fishery in order to ensure their recovery. '
255. The La Jolla Agreement is a voluntary agreement that is administered through the
IATTC, which acts as Secretariat to the International Review Panel. Decisions affecting the
Agreement and the International Dolphin Conservation Program are taken by the
participating governments at plenary meetings of the Intergovernmental body, usually held
in conjunction with meetings of the IATTC. AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
DOLPHINS: SUMMARY DOCUMENTATION OF DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PLENARY AND
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW PANEL, at Introduction (Apr. 1992-Jan. 1995) [hereinafter
SUMMARY].
256. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 68.
257. Id
258. In 1993, the first year of the program, dolphin mortality for the international fleet
was reduced to only 3,601 animals-almost 12,000 animals fewer than the 1992 mortality
levels and well below the 1999 dolphin mortality target of 5,000 animals. MARINE MAMMAL
COMMISSION, 1994 ANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESS 116-17, 122 (1995).
259. The overall dolphin mortality limit for 1994 was reduced from 15,500 to 9,300
while actual mortality was approximately 3,600. SUMMARY, supra note 255, at app. 11.
Similarly, the limit for 1995 was reduced from 12,000 to 9,300. Id. at iv and app. 20.
260. Mortality [in 1994], expressed as a percentage of abundance, was 0.13% and
0.09% for the northeastern and western-southern stocks of offshore spotted dolphin,
0.12% and 0.06% for the eastern and whitebelly stocks of spinner dolphin, 0.02%.
0.04%, and 0.0% for the northern, central, and southern stocks of common dolphin.
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Both the Agreement and the Convention should be evaluated for their
complete ability to conserve and manage tuna stocks, 1 and prevent an
increase in mortality of dolphins or other bycatch species. This evaluation
should anticipate additional vessels entering or re-entering the fishery.
The Agreement and the Convention are worth salvaging, for they are
models, particularly in their commitment to nongovernmental organization
participation, for other international fishery management regimes. 2
C. The Panama Declaration
In October 1995, twelve nations (Belize, Columbia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, France, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Spain, Vanuatu,
Venezuela, and the United States) signed the Declaration of Panama, a
historic international agreement to protect dolphins and biodiversity in the
ETP.263 This declaration was also endorsed by five environmental groups
(the Center for Marine Conservation, Environmental Defense Fund,
Greenpeace, National Wildlife Federation and World Wildlife Fund,
altogether comprising over ten million members world-wide). 2' The
At these mortality levels the population should continue to experience growth over
time given an estimated net rate of reproduction for dolphin stocks in the ETP of
approximately two percent annually. Nevertheless, additional progress is necessary
as these low levels of mortality still do not meet the stated goal of the La Jolla
Agreement of "eliminating dolphin mortality in this fishery ......
Hearings, supra note 173, at 67 (citing REP. OF THE SCI. COMMITTEE, 47TH ANN. MEETING
OF THE INT'L WHALING COMMISSION, DUBLIN, IRELAND (May/June 1995)).
261. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, most of
the world's fisheries are either fully- or overexploited. By contrast, the ETP
ecosystem is relatively healthy. Tuna populations are stable, recruitment has
increased, and catches have been well below the Commission's projected amount-an
annual harvest in the range of 300,000 short tons. The 1993 and 1994 catch of
yellowfin tuna was well below this at 249,200 short tons and 233,822 short tons
respectively.
Hearings, supra note 173, at 66 (statement of Suzanne Iudicello, Vice President for
Programs, Center for Marine Conservation, on behalf of the Environmental Defense Fund,
Greenpeace, National Audubon Society, National Wildlife Federation, Whale and Dolphin
Conservation Society, and World Wildlife Fund) (citing MINUTES OF THE 54TH AND 55TH
ANN. MEETING OF THE INTER-AM. TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, LA JOLLA, CAL. (Oct. 1994
& June 1995)).
262. See Hearings, supra note 172, at 68.
263. See Panama Declaration, supra note 5.
264. STATEMENT OF THE CENTER FOR MARINE CONSERVATION, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND, GREENPEACE, THE NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, AND THE WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND TO THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL MEETING OF NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE
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Panama Declaration will give rise to an international agreement that
secures the existing protections for dolphin populations, provides a basis
for further reductions in dolphin mortality, protects the ETP ocean
ecosystem, and more aggressively conserves and manages the tuna
fishery. The Panama Declaration protects not only dolphins and the tuna
that swim beneath them, but also the diversity of marine life that depends
on the health of the oceans as a wholeY25 In short, the Panama
Declaration contains all of the necessary components of a lasting solution
to the tuna/dolphin problem.
To implement the Panama Declaration, Congress needs to amend the
MMPA's existing comparability standards under section 101, which are
the basis for the current embargo. Congress must also amend the present
standards for defining "dolphin safe.""°  By making these legislative
1992 LA JOLLA AGREEMENT TO REDUCE DOLPHIN MORTALITY IN THE EASTERN PACIFIC
TROPICAL TUNA FISHERY, MEETING IN PANAMA CrrY, PANAMA, Oct. 4, 1995, (on file with
Authors).
265. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 354 (statement of Nina M. Young, Marine
Mammalogist, Center for Marine Conservation, on behalf of the Environmental Defense
Fund, Greenpeace, National Wildlife Federation, and World Wildlife Fund). More
specifically, the Panama Declaration is the basis for a binding legal agreement under the
auspices of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) which will:
(1) set a goal of eliminating dolphin mortality by progressively reducing mortality
through the setting of annual limits;
(2) cap mortality at low levels;
(3) establish species/stock mortality limits which, by the year 2001, will meet the
M PA goal of a zero mortality rate for all dolphins and for each species or stock;
(4) establish a system that provides incentives to vessel captains to reduce and
eventually eliminate dolphin mortality;
(5) mandate reductions in bycatch of marine life taken in the fishery;
(6) require that the fishery be managed using a precautionary approach;
(7) establish scientific advisory groups to advise national governments and the
IATTC on research and the conservation and management of the fishery and the
ecosystem;
(8) strengthen the International Dolphin Conservation Program under the existing
La Jolla Agreement by requiring membership in the IATTC;
(9) strengthen enforcement by imposing trade embargoes on countries that fail to
comply with the new agreement;
(10) provide, through a strengthened labeling system, a strong economic incentive
for fishers to fish for tuna without killing a single dolphin.
Id
266. The implementing legislation H.R. 2823 and S. 1420, currently being considered
by Congress, strengthens enforcement of the La Jolla Agreement/Panama Declaration by
imposing trade embargoes on countries that fail to comply with the new agreement. In
addition, it provides a strengthened tracking, verification, and labeling system that will
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changes, Congress will provide strong protections for dolphins and
strengthen the dolphin safe label by guaranteeing that dolphins are not
killed in the ETP tuna fishery. 67 Through an improved, enforceable on-
board observer program and tuna tracking system, U.S. consumers will
be assured for the first time ever that the dolphin safe label means what
it says. 268
provide a strong economic incentive for fishers to fish for tuna without killing a single
dolphin. See H.R. 2823, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 1420, 104th Cong. (1996). See also H.R.
REP. No. 104-665, pts. 1 & 2 (1996); Panama Declaration, supra note 5, at Annex I.
267. The Tracking and Verification procedures of H.R. 2823 require the Secretary, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to issue regulations not later than three
months after the date of enactment. H.R. 2823, 104th Cong. § 4(i) (1996). The regulations
shall, consistent with international efforts and in coordination with the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission, establish a domestic and international tracking and verification
program that provides for the effective tracking of tuna labeled "dolphin safe" by including:
(1) Specific regulations and provisions addressing the use of weight calculation;
(2) Additional measures to enhance observer coverage if necessary;
(3) Well location and procedures for monitoring, certifying, and sealing holds above
and below deck or other equally effective methods of tracking and verifying tuna
labeled under [the statute];
(4) Reporting receipt of and database storage of radio and facsimile transmittals from
fishing vessels containing information related to the definition of sets;
(5) Shore-based verification and tracking throughout the transshipment and canning
process; and
(6) Provisions for annual audits for caught, landed, and processed tuna products
labeled in accordance with [the statute].
Id. These provisions provide a comprehensive ship-to-shelf tracking system that will
improve the existing tracking and verification system and ultimately provide greater
consumer confidence in the "dolphin safe" label. The amendments will result in measures
to enhance the tracking and verification of tuna labeled "dolphin safe." The proposed
provisions would require segregation by weight, segregation by hold, and the sealing of such
holds, and monitoring of the loading and landing of safe and unsafe tuna by a combination
of observers and electronic surveillance. In addition, the proposed provisions call for an
expanded paper trail to accompany the tuna throughout fishing, transshipment (transfer to
another vessel), and processing (including loining and canning). Most important, the
proposed provisions would require the Secretary to conduct periodic audits and spot checks
to verify compliance with the program. These measures are necessary to improve the
existing tracking and verification system both in and outside the eastern tropical Pacific, and
they will create greater confidence in the "dolphin safe" label.
268. Id; see also Panama Declaration, supra note 5.
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VI. Impact of Implementing the Panama Declaration on Dolphins
and Marine Life in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
To effectively evaluate the impact that the Panama Declaration will
have on dolphin stocks, tuna stocks and their marine environment, several
issues must be examined.
A. The Status of Dolphin Stocks in the ETP Will Improve
Absolute abundance estimates for dolphins taken in the ETP tuna
fishery, obtained from research vessel cruises conducted between 1986
and 1990, are summarized in Table 1. The table shows the nine dolphin
stocks (or populations) from four dolphin species that are frequently taken
as bycatch in the yellowfin tuna fishery.29 Spotted (Stenella attenuata),
spinner (S. longirostris), and common (Delphinus delphis) dolphins are the
victims in over ninety-five percent of dolphin deaths.' More than eighty-
five percent, and perhaps as high as ninety-eight percent, of all of the sets
made on dolphins in the yellowfin tuna fishery in any given year involve
either spotted, spinner dolphins, or both speciesY Consequently, while
all stocks have declined since the fishery began, the northeastern offshore
spotted dolphin has declined by more than forty percent r272 and the eastern
spinner dolphin is at forty-four percent 3 of its pre-fishery abundance.
Both of these species are now listed as "depleted" under the MMEPA.274
Recognizing that all dolphin stocks taken in the tuna fishery have
269. Gerrodette & Wade, 36-Year Summary, supra note 15.
270. MARTINA. HALL, ETAL., THE ASSOCIATION OF TUNAS WITH FLOATING OBJECTS AND
DOLPHINS INTHE EASTERN PACIFIC OCEAN (Part HI: The purse-seine fishery for tunas in the
eastern tropical Pacific Ocean) at fig. 6 (Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 1992).
271. Id Offshore spotted dolphins, alone, generally are involved in over sixty percent
of all sets made on dolphins in the yellowfln fishery. Id.
272. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Listing of the Northern Offshore
Spotted Dolphin as Depleted, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,207, 27,209 (1992) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 216) (proposed June 18, 1992).
273. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals' Listing of Eastern Spiner Dolphin as
Depleted, 57 Fed. Reg. 27,014 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 216) (proposed June 17,
1992). Id.
274. Recent unpublished analyses suggest that the eastern spinner stock may be below
one-fourth of its pre-fishery abundance. See Gerrodette & Wade: 36-Year Summary, supra
note 15.
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experienced some level of decline since the fishery began,275 the low
estimated rates of increase for these stocks (less than five percent),
combined with our inability to detect increases of less than five percent,
have made it difficult to determine to what degree these stocks are
recovering.' This problem has been further complicated by the fact that
until the implementation of the 1988 amendments to the MMPA and, sub-
sequently, the La Jolla agreement, the annual mortality of these two stocks
was high enough to hamper or retard recovery of these populations.'
Recent data based on relative indices of abundance278 indicate that all
stocks (including the depleted eastern spinner stock and northeastern
offshore spotted stock) are stable or slightly increasing, fluctuating around
the same levels for the past two decades.279 With the annual incidental
275. Id
276. See generally, Paul P. Wade, Abundance and Population Dynamics of Two Eastern
Pacific Dolphins, Stenella attenuata and Stenella longirostris orientalis (1994) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California (San Diego)) (on file with Authors) [hereinafter Wade
dissertation].
277. Id
278. These relative indices of abundance-indices derived from tuna vessel observer
data-should be used with caution. A number of problems prevent these data from
providing an unbiased estimate of the absolute number of dolphins in a population (absolute
abundance). Any relative index of abundance must be used in combination with absolute
abundance estimates obtained from research vessel surveys to accurately determine the actual
abundance of a dolphin stock. Problems include the non-random searching behavior of the
tuna vessels, selective passing of information from the fisher to the observer (e.g. schools
not associated with tuna often are not reported), higher school encounter rates than research
vessels, and a bias towards large school size in tuna vessel observer data. Because of these
biases and the limitations specifically described in relation to northeastern offshore spotted
and eastern spinner dolphins, relative indices of abundance only provide rough estimates of
trends in abundance.
279. IATTC, DRAFt REPORT ON 1995 RELATIVE INDICES OF ABUNDANCE ESTIMATES
(copy on file with Authors). In 1993 and 1994, the relative abundance estimates for the
northeastern offshore spotted stock showed a decline. Scientists do not know the exact
reason for the decrease, but there are several hypotheses. First, evidence indicates the large
scale movements of these dolphins across stock boundaries results in some portion of the
overall population being outside the range assumed by the relative index of abundance
analysis and, therefore, that portion is not accounted for in the calculation of the relative
index of abundance. These movements are often in response to climatic and oceanographic
changes, in this case, the prolonged El Nio from 1991 to the first part of 1994. A.A.
ANGANUZZI & S.T. BUCKLAND, PRELIMINARY RESULTS ON THE RELATIVE ABUNDANCE OF
DOLPHINS ASSOCIATED wrrH TUNA IN THE EASTERN TROPICAL PACIFIC OCEAN FOR 1994, REP.
INT'L WHALING COMM'N.47 (1995). See also, ELIZABETH F. EDwARDS, NOAA TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM NOAA-TM-NMFS-SWFC- 122, USING TUNA-VESSEL OBSERVER DATA TO
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mortality for all stocks now below 0.2% of the population abundance,
these dolphin populations should be able to recover.'
B. The Panama Declaration will Promote Dolphin Stock Recovery
In 1992, the National Research Council stated that:
DETECT TRENDS IN ABUNDANCE OF DOLPHIN POPULATIONS: HISTORY AND RESEARCH TO
DATE (1988)(1989).
Second, because the incidental kill declined substantially after 1976, one might have
expected the northeastern offshore spotted stock to have increased between 1979 and 1990.
However, due to large interannual variation in the abundance estimates, for trends to be
detected over the five-year survey period, stock sizes would have had to increase or decrease
by approximately forty to fifty percent (or more than five percent annually) making it
difficult to detect trends with any accuracy. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL
REPORTTO CONGRESS 101 (1992). Third, the population decline may be attributable to the
biology of dolphins and a natural lag in reproduction. The estimated age of sexual maturity
for northeastern offshore spotted dolphins is 12 years. For northeastern offshore spotted
dolphins, scientific data indicate that more mature animals are killed in the fishery. JAY
BARLOW AND ALETA HOHN, NOAA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM NOAA-TM-NMFS-SWFC-
48, INTERPRETING SPOTTED DOLPHIN AGE DISTRIBUTIONS (1984). In addition, the mean
annual kill of northeastern spotted dolphins from 1979-1990 was 19,200 or 2.5% of the
population abundance estimate. See Wade dissertation, supra note 276, at 195. Kill
estimates between 1988 and 1990 were between three percent and four percent of the
population abundance estimate. Id. at 189. The bias alone toward kills of sexually mature
animals in particular would have prevented any substantial population growth but when
combined with take that equaled or exceeded the estimated maximum population growth rate
of 3.8% it is no wonder that this dolphin stock was having difficulty recovering. Id. at 216.
Therefore, the population may have continued to decline because of a natural lag induced
by the relatively late sexual maturity-the population may only now be reaching a point
when there are a sufficient number of sexually mature females so the stock can begin to
grow. Id. at 188-89.
The same may also be true for eastern spinner dolphins which have an estimated age of
sexual maturity of ten years. It has not been determined whether kill estimates for this
species are biased toward mature animals; nonetheless, the mean annual kill of the eastern
spinner dolphin from 1979-1990 was 7,700, or 1.5% of the population abundance estimate.
See id. at 168. Kill estimates between 1988 and 1989 were between two percent and three
percent of the population abundance estimate. Id. at 158. The high kill rates may have
retarded any substantial population growth given the estimated maximum population growth
rate of 2.2%. See id. at 216. If the fishery killed more mature animals, the recovery of this
population may be further delayed. Id.
280. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 360 (statement of Nina M. Young, Marine
Mammaogist, Center for Marine Conservation); id. at 316-17 (statement of Elizabeth
Edwards, Ph.D., Leader, Dolphin Safe Research Program, National Marine Fisheries
Service, Southwest Fisheries Science Center); id. at 333 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D.,
Director, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission).
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A kill rate of 40,000 animals per year would thus represent a kill rate
of 25 % or less of recruitment, almost certainly low enough to permit
current dolphin populations to be stable and perhaps to increase. An
annual kill of 20,000 (12.5% or less of recruitment) would probably
result in substantial increases in dolphin populations."1
By the end of the 1992 fishing season, incidental mortality levels for all
of the dolphin stocks had declined to less than one percent of the estimated
population.m Scientists stated that at these levels the stocks would
eventually increase and recover.2
At present, the annual incidental mortality in the ETP fishery is less
than 0.2%. In all but two cases (northeastern offshore spotted and eastern
spinner) the annual incidental mortality is less than 0.1% of the minimum
population size for all dolphin stocks.' While any dolphin death caused
by humans is undesirable, the great majority of independent and
government marine mammal scientists consider these mortality levels to
have a "negligible impact" on the dolphin stocks and to meet the MMPA's
zero mortality rate goal.2u
The Panama Declaration caps stock-specific mortality at the 0.2% level
and requires that the fishery be at or below the 0.1% level by the year
2001.m According to the NRC, "the committee notes that a complete ban
on dolphin fishing or the purchase of tuna caught on dolphins is not
required to ensure the survival and even the increase of dolphin
populations. "28 Undoubtedly, by providing overall and stock specific
mortality levels more than four times lower than that recommended by the
NRC panel, the Panama Declaration will permit the recovery of these
stocks to their former abundance.
281. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 70-71.
282. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 360 (statement of Nina M. Young, Marine
Mammalogist, Center for Marine Conservation).
283. Id
284. Id.
285. See aIsoNATONALMARNEFISHERiES SERVICE, OFFICE OF PROTErED REsOURCES,
1994 REPORT OF THE PBR (Potential Biological Removal) WORKSHOP 8-9.
286. Panama Declaration, supra note 5.
287. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 71.
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C. Changing the Definition of 'Dolphin Safe" Will Not Result in
Levels of Stress Associated with Chase and Encirclement That
Will Retard the Recovery of These Populations
Stress is a nonspecific response of the body to any demand made upon
it. Stress can consist of three phases.' The first phase, the Alarm Phase,
is where an animal perceives a threat and the body initiates a rapid
physiological response involving the nervous system and the endocrine
system. 289 The Adaptation or Compensation Phase occurs when, after
prolonged exposure to the stressors, the animal adapts to or compensates
for the altered conditions causing the stress.2' The third phase, the
Maladaption Phase occurs when the stress is of sufficient intensity and
duration that compensation or adaption is impossible." In this phase, if
the stress is severe or persistent, the body may fail to compensate for the
stress. Under the worst circumstances, the body may develop a
pathological condition (e.g., illness, infection, immune suppression, or
death). 29
Dolphins, having evolved in the rigorous marine environment, have
adapted to cope with many natural and human-related stressors.2"' For
nearly twenty years, U.S. vessels could obtain a general permit under the
MMPA and its regulations to annually chase and encircle hundreds of
thousands of dolphins in the yellowfin tuna fishery in the ETR2
Dolphins have been chased and encircled in this fishery for more than
thirty-five years and have displayed adaptive behaviors in the nets since
the 1970s (e.g., fewer displays of panicky dashing about the net).2  In
1992, the NRC noted that:
288. LESLIE A. DIERAUF, CRC HANDBOOK OF MARINE MAMMAL MEDICINE: HEALTH,
DISEASE, AND REHABILITATION 295, 296 (1990).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at91.
293. Id. at 90.
294. See 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2)(i)(A)(2) (1995) (outlining take restrictions, including
limits on mortality, harassment, and encirclement).
295. See generally Karen Pryor & Ingrid Kang Shallenberger, Social Structure in
Spotted Dolphins (Stenella attenuata) in the Tuna Purse Seine Fishery in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific, in DOLPHIN SOCIETIES: DIScOvERIES AND PUZZLES 161-96 (Karen Pryor
& Kenneth S. Norris eds. 1991).
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No specific information is available concerning the effects of the
chase on the biology of dolphins. The chase is likely to result in
stress. Some herds have developed strategies to avoid capture;
others seem to have habituated to encirclement and seem to have
developed behavioral patterns that reduce their risks once in the
net.296
Some environmental groups have argued that the chase and
encirclement of dolphins causes stress of a duration and magnitude that
severely impedes dolphin reproduction or even results in dolphin deaths
(sometimes referred to as cryptic death).29' According to the phases
outlined above, the chase, capture, and release of dolphins in the
yellowfin tuna fishery is likely to result in an Alarm Phase and an
Adaptation Phase. Whether it results in the Maladoption Phase is simply
not known. Available scientific data provide no indication that mortality
occurs after the dolphins are released from tuna purse seine nets.298
Furthermore, no scientific data demonstrate a preponderance of stress-
related diseases or injuries in these dolphin stocks.2 99
Speculative claims of reproductive complications or depressed
reproductive capacity caused by stress related to chase and encirclement
also lack any sound evidentiary basis. In an investigation of mortality in
the tuna fishery, researchers looking for signs of stress found none, stating
that reproductive tracts of dolphins collected from tuna vessels in the early
1980s were examined for evidence of spontaneous abortion and muscle
myopathy, but no evidence of either was found.301 Another investigation,
by Myrick and Perkins, claimed that stock differences in density-
dependent reproductive factors were not as predicted by scientific models
and thus supported the hypothesis that stress can cause reproductive
296. NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 114.
297. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 379 (statement of Jeffrey Pike on behalf of the
Dolphin Safe Fair Trade Campaign) (alleging stress factors related to chase and encircle-
ment).
298. See id. at 320 (statement of Elizabeth Edwards, Ph.D., Leader, Dolphin Safe
Research Program, National Marine Fisheries Service, Southwest Fisheries Science Center).
299. Tim D. Smith, Changes in Size of Three Dolphin (Stenella spp.) Populations in the
Eastern Tropical Pacific, 81 FIsHERY BULL. 1, 6 (1983).
300. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 379 (statement of Jeffrey Pike on behalf of the
Dolphin Safe Fair Trade Campaign) (alleging stress factors related to chase and encircle-
ment).
301. See Smith, supra note 299, at 6.
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depression .302 Density dependent factors include the following: juvenile
and adult survival rates, average age at sexual maturity, pregnancy rates,
and juvenile growth rates.30 3 These factors change in response to
population status. 3'4 For example, in populations that have been severely
reduced, such as the eastern spinner and northeastern offshore spotted,
one would expect changes in reproductive density-dependent factors such
as a decline in the average age of sexual maturity and an increase in the
proportion of simultaneously pregnant and lactating females. 35 The study
by Myrick and Perkins cites a study by Chivers and Myrick" which
found that a stock with a longer fishing history had a higher age at sexual
maturity than a population with a short history. As stated, this difference
was contrary to what would be predicted (e.g., a decline in age at
reproduction). 3  The researchers attributed these findings to stress.308
However, the Chivers and Myrick study and a subsequent study, with
larger sample sizes, demonstrated that changes in several density-
dependent reproductive factors were present as expected for several
dolphin stocks, with no evidence of stress-related reproductive
inhibition.3 9
In addition, Myrick investigated several potential physical indicators of
stress as they relate to chase and encirclement.310 In one study, he
reported that spotted dolphins, chased and captured in tuna purse seine
nets, have substantially depressed serum calcium values which could
302. Albert C. Myrick, Jr. & Peter C. Perkins, Adrenocortical Color Darkness and
Correlates as Indicators of Continuous Acute Premortem Stress in Chased and Purse-Seine
Captured Male Dolphins, 2 PATHOPHYSIOLOGY 191 (1995).
303. Susan J. Chivers & Albert C. Myrick, Comparison ofAge at Sexual Maturity and
Other Reproductive Parameters for Two Stocks of Spotted Dolphins (Stenella attenuata),
91 FISHERY BULL. 611 (1993).
304. Id.
305. Id. at 611-12.
306. Id. at611-18.
307. S.J. Chivers & D.P. DeMaster, Evaluation of Biological Indices for Three Eastern
Tropical Pacific Dolphin Species, 58(3) J. WILDL. MGMT. 470-478 (1994). See also, S.J.
Chivers and A.C. Myrick, Comparison ofAge at Sexual Maturity and Other Reproductive
Parameters for Two Stocks of Spotted Dolphins (Stenella attenuata), 91 FISHERY BULL. 611-
18 (1993).
308. Myrick & Perkins, supra note 302, at 201.
309. See Chivers & DeMaster, supra note 307, at 318.
310. See A.C. Myrick, Jr. et al., Hypocalcemia in Spotted Dolphins (Stenella attenuata)
Chased and Captured by Purse Seiners in the Eastern Tropical Pacific, SEVENTH BIENNIAL
CONFERENCE ON THE BIOLOGY OF MARINE MAMMALS: ABSTRACTS, MIAMI, FLORIDA, USA
49(1987).
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potentially cause death. Presumably, the perception of a threat may
cause the release of stress-related hormones,1 2 causing calcium to be
removed from the serum and sequestered in the cells, thus lowering serum
calcium. 3  Myrick found that, as a result of being chased for approxi-
mately forty-five minutes and being held prior to release for an additional
two hours, serum calcium levels were between 7.3 to 8.7 mg/dl. He
assumed these levels were far below normal. 314 However, these observed
values fall within the published normal ranges for dolphins of 4 to 11
mg/dl. 31
5
Myrick and Perkins postulate that dolphin adrenal gland color changes
could be used as indicators of stress. However, due to problems in
experimental design, the hypothesis was not proven.316 Dolphins caught
in association with tuna fishing probably exhibit the various stress phases.
It is likely that the dolphins experience the Alarm Phase of stress (or "fight
or flight" response) when they hear the distinctive sound of helicopters,
speedboats, or purse seiners. During chase, capture, confinement, and
release, the body's reaction to stress in the Adaptation Phase is individual,
but may be positively influenced by the dolphin's past experience in the
fishery. The best available published scientific literature does not indicate
that this stress is so severe as to cause death or impede the long-term
recovery of a dolphin stock. The issue merits further scientific
investigation. Legislation currently before Congress contains provisions
requiring further investigation into the impact of chase and encirclement
on dolphin biology and health. 7
311. Id
312. Specifically, parathyroid hormone is released when blood calcium is depressed. Id
313. Id
314. Id
315. W. Medway & JR. Geraci, Clinical Pathology of Marine Mammals, in Zoo AND
WILD ANIMAL MEDICINE 795, table 47-12 (Murray E. Fowler ed., 2d ed. 1986).
316. The results of the study are undermined by lack of controls (e.g., adrenal glands
from unstressed dolphins of the same or similar species; sample collection at various
postmortem intervals to determine degradation; color differences between frozen versus
formalin fixed tissue; color differences between entangled/asphyxiated animals versus
stressed animals); and failure to examine the dolphins for other underlying diseases (e.g.,
pneumonia, parasitism, nutritional state) which could have caused discoloration in the
adrenal cortex. Memorandum from Elizabeth Edwards, Southwest Fisheries Science Center,
National Marine Fisheries Service, NOAA, to Michael Tillman (June 21, 1996) (summary
of reviewer's comments on adrenal color paper by Myrick and reviewers' recommendations
on future research) (on file with the Ocean and Coastal Law Journal).
317. See H.R. 2823, 104th Cong. § 5(c) (1995); S. 1420, 104th Cong. § 5(c) (1995).
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Conservation organizations supporting the Panama Declaration would
prefer that tuna fishing be conducted without encircling dolphins, but no
ecologically sound and economically viable alternatives have been
identified." 8 If further research shows that stress resulting from
encirclement is likely to retard recovery, the legislation before Congress
contains emergency provisions to end encirclement.3 9 In the absence of
such research findings, the best approach is offered by the Panama
Declaration. The Declaration seeks to protect dolphins while addressing
the equally important and scientifically demonstrated need to reduce the
ecologically-damaging bycatch of sea turtles, juvenile tuna, sharks, and
billfish resulting from fishing methods other than setting on dolphins.
D. The Panama Declaration Will Protect Endangered Sea Turtles,
Juvenile Tuna, Sharks and Bilfish, As Well As Dolphins, by
Reducing Bycatch in the ETP Tuna Fishery
In the MMPA, Congress stated:
[I]t is the sense of the Congress that they [(dolphins)] should be
protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible
commensurate with sound policies of resource management and that
the primary objective of their management should be to maintain the
health and stability of the marine ecosystem.320
Because most of the IATTC's efforts have focused on reducing dolphin
mortality, less attention has been devoted to maintaining the overall health
and stability of the marine ecosystem in the ETP.32' The implementation
of the Panama Declaration will, for the first time, require measures to
protect the whole ETP ecosystem.322
318. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 364 (statement of Nina M. Young, Marine
Mammalogist, Center for Marine Conservation, on behalf of the Environmental Defense
Fund, Greenpeace, National Wildlife Federation, and World Wildlife Fund).
319. See H.R. 2823, 104th Cong. § 5(c) (1995); S. 1420, 104th Cong. § 5(c) (1995).
320. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1994).
321. See generally Hearings, supra note 173, at 321 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D.,
Director, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission); see also Reply to questions
submitted by the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans to James Joseph, Ph.D.
Director, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, April 17, 1996 (copy on file with
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans of the House Resources Committee).
322. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 337 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D., Director,
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission) (discussing discard rates ofjuvenile tuna).
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As our knowledge about fishery conservation and management
increases, so does our concern about the impact of bycatch on the marine
ecosystem.3z This concern is reflected in recent action in Congress and
in the United Nations to mandate reducing bycatch as part of fishery
conservation and management. Congress has amended the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act's (MFCMA) provisions to
better define bycatch. These amendments also add a new national standard
that calls upon fishery management councils to minimize bycatch. 3u
Similar language exists in the United Nations Treaty on Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, which was ratified by the
United States on August 7, 1996.3z
Opponents of the Panama Declaration view the concern over bycatch
as a red herring. They claim that in the 1970s and 1980s, when the
fishery was larger, bycatch was probably greater because the number of
school and log sets was larger.326 Furthermore, they argue, the ETP tuna
fishery engages in relatively little bycatch compared to other commercial
fisheries.327 However, the data indicate that bycatch is greater now and
is a potential problem in the ETP-especially for juvenile tuna-and
prohibitions on dolphin sets will exacerbate the problem.3' Domestic and
323. Between 17.9 and 39.5 million tons of fish are discarded each year in commercial
fisheries. Although there is insufficient data to determine the biological, ecological,
economic and cultural impacts of discards, economic losses are estimated to run in the
billions of dollars. A Global Assessment ofFisheries Bycatch and Discards, U.N. Food and
Agriculture Organization, Fisheries Technical Paper 339, vii (1994).
324. See H.R. 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4(34), 7(8) (1995); S.39, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 103(2), 107(b)(9) (1995).
325. The U.N. treaty specifically seeks to:
IM]inimize pollution, waste, discards, catch by lost or abandoned gear, catch of non-
target species, both fish and non-fish species, (hereinafter referred to as non-target
species) and impacts on associated or dependent species, in particular endangered
species, through measures including, to extent practicable, the development and use
of selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective fishing gear and techniques.
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea 10 December 1982 to the Convention and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Article 5(f), 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995). See also
White House Press Release, August 7, 1996 (announcing ratification of fisheries
conservation agreement) (copy on file with the Ocean and CoastalLaw Journal).
326. See Hearings, supra note 173, at 380 (statement of Jeff Pike, Dolphin Safe Fair
Trade Campaign) (alleging that even during years when there were larger number of dolphin
sets, number of log and school sets was still higher than it is today).
327. See id
328. See id at 326 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D. Director, Inter-American Tropical
Tuna'Commission) (discard rates ofjuvenile tuna).
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inter-national fisheries conservation and management efforts have clearly
made bycatch reduction a priority.329 IATTC's extensive database on
bycatch in the ETP tuna fishery will enable nations to develop clear,
effective and, in some cases, immediate measures for bycatch reduction.330
The Panama Declaration provides the vehicle that enables nations to work
within the IATTC to develop these measures to "avoid, reduce and
minimize bycatch of juvenile yellowf'm tuna and bycatch of non-target
species....
In summary, the catch and discard of juvenile tuna or other marine life
cannot be condoned if commercial fisheries are managed using a
precautionary approach, and if conservation and recovery of protected
species is to occur. Every effort should be made to avoid and reduce the
catching and discarding of juvenile tuna and other marine life, in order to
further promote the long-term sustainability and health of tuna stocks, as
well as the biodiversity of the ecosystem as a whole in the ETP. The
Panama Declaration provides a mechanism to further advance the
precautionary goals, internationally, of the MFCMA and the U.N. Treaty.
E. The Panama Declaration Will Protect
the Tuna Resource in the ETP Tuna Fishery
According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,
most of the world's fisheries are either fully exploited or overexploited.33
By contrast, the ETP ecosystem is relatively healthy. Overall, the stocks
of yellowfm and skipjack in the ETP are at high levels of abundance and
are not overfished.333
329. See supra notes 324-325 and accompanying text.
330. See Reply to questions submitted by the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife, and
Oceans to James Joseph, Ph.D. Director, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, April
17, 1996. According to IATrC they are "pointing out areas and seasons where problems of
bycatch are more serious. These are being compared to the catches of tunas in the same
operations." Id. Several options that the nations may eventually consider if they decide to
reduce bycatches are: close the areas or seasons where the ratios of bycatch/catch or where
bycatch is greatest; modify the purse seine to reduce bycatch; improve procedures for
handling the bycatch to reduce mortality and increase survivorship; and improve the
utilization of the bycatch.
331. Panama Declaration, supra note 5.
332. See supra note 323.
333. From 1986 to 1995 the annual catch of yellowfin and skipjack in the purse seine
tuna fleet in the ETP ranged between 325,000 and 425,000 tons, about three-quarters of it
yellowfin. According to IATTC, the yellowfin stock is capable of sustaining annual catches
The Flipper Phenomenon
Tuna populations are stable, recruitment has increased, and catches
have been well below the Commission's projected amount-an annual
harvest in the range of 300,000 short tons.3 4 The 1993 and 1994 catch
of yellowfin tuna was well below this level, at 249,200 short tons and
233,822 short tons, respectively.33
To prevent the tuna stocks in the ETP from becoming overfished, the
Panama Declaration requires the IATTC to "[a]dopt conservation and
management measures that ensure the long-term sustainability of tuna
stocks and other stocks of living marine resources...., 336 The Panama
Declaration also requires IATTC to use a precautionary approach and to
maintain or restore tuna stocks to levels capable of producing their
maximum sustainable yield. 337 These provisions are consistent with the
U.N. Treaty on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, which also
mandates the use of a precautionary approach and the maintenance of fish
stocks at levels capable of producing the maximum sustainable yield.338
Therefore, implementation of these provisions of the Panama Declaration
will ensure that the IATrC continues its outstanding record of conserving
the tuna stocks.
VII. CONCLUSION
"Dolphin safe" as currently defined and the status quo under the
embargoes will not stop dolphins from drowning in tuna nets in the ETP
and will certainly not protect the ETP ecosystem and its marine life.
Implementation of the Panama Declaration will help secure lasting,
effective protection for dolphins, tuna, and other marine life in the ETP.
The Panama Declaration will preserve and build upon the unprecedented
of about 300,000 tons at optimum levels of fishing effort. See Hearings, supra note 173, at
332-33 (statement of James Joseph, Ph.D., Director, Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission) (discard rates ofjuvenile tuna).
334. Minutes of the 54th and 55th Annual Meeting of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, La Jolla, California. October 1994 and June 1995 (on file with the Ocean and
Coastal Law Journal).
335. l
336. Panama Declaration, supra note 5.
337. Ia
338. Draft Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea 10 December 1982 to the Convention and Management
ofStraddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, article 5(b)-(c), 34 I.L.M. 1542
(1995).
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progress made under the MMPA and the La Jolla Agreement in reducing
dolphin mortality.
The Panama Declaration will further provide an effective model for
fishery conservation and management throughout the world. It will ensure
the protection of the tuna resource, dolphins, marine biodiversity, and
fishers alike. Conservation and management measures will be based on
sound science. The program will continue to emphasize the importance
of research (especially research into alternative methods of capturing tuna
that do not involve encirclement), and it will strengthen what are currently
only voluntary processes.
More importantly, the Panama Declaration will meet two critical needs
to strengthen the existing IATTC regime. First, it will provide the basis
for the establishment of a binding legal agreement within the IATTC.
Second, it will require nations to become members of the IATTC.
Finally, the Panama Declaration will also require nations to implement the
provisions of the agreement in their own national laws or regulations,
enhancing each country's ability to enforce the Panama Declaration
conditions.339
The Panama Declaration will achieve the international cooperation that
the IDCA could not. The United States will continue to use its markets
to enforce this international agreement. Once the new binding legal
agreement instituting the Panama Declaration has been developed, the
existing tuna embargoes will be lifted. The United States, however, will
only import tuna from other countries caught in compliance with the new
agreement. Tuna from any nation found to be out of compliance or
diminishing the effectiveness of the new agreement will be embargoed.
The implementation of the Panama Declaration will provide strong
incentives to fishers to eliminate dolphin mortality through the
strengthened redefinition of the dolphin safe label, for only tuna that is
caught using methods which avoid killing any dolphins will be allowed to
bear the dolphin safe label. Through an improved, enforceable, on-board
observer program and tuna tracking system, the dolphin safe label will
mean to consumers what many of them have thought it has meant all
along-that no dolphins were killed in the harvesting of the tuna contained
in the product bearing the label.
The complexities of the tuna-dolphin problem in the ETP require that
we strike a balance. This balance should maintain the active participation
of the fishing nations in a binding international agreement that will reduce
and potentially eliminate dolphin mortality, protect and recover depleted
339. Panama Declaration, supra note 5.
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dolphin species, reduce bycatch and conserve other marine life, and
guarantee the conservation and proper management of the tuna fishery.
Perhaps the most salient merit of the Panama Declaration is that it
represents strong consensus among leading conservation groups, the
Clinton Administration, the U.S. tuna fishing industry, and eleven foreign
fishing nations on how best to solve these vexing problems.
International problems demand international solutions. The NRC panel
recognized this when it stated that "any policy designed to reduce dolphin
mortality or prevent it absolutely will be effective only if it is based on
sound information and if most or all nations that fish for dolphin-
associated tuna anywhere in the world participate in its implementation. " I
In the long run we cannot protect marine life in international waters solely
through unilateral mandates, especially as nations develop markets outside
the United States for their tuna.
At the end of the 104th Congress, the Senate failed to take up the
International Dolphin Conservation Program Act-the implementing legis-
lation for the Panama Declaration. Congress' failure to act makes the
future of dolphin conservation uncertain as it may jeopardize the existing
voluntary regime.341 Senator John Breaux (D-LA) stated, "if we do not
enact this treaty, we are going to lose the great progress that has already
been made. These countries now that are trying to cooperate are going
to lose incentive to do so.042 The United States must act now to cement
the international cooperation manifested in the Panama Declaration.
Failure to act could undermine the world's most ambitious and potentially
successful international fisheries management and dolphin conservation
regime.*
340. See NRC REPORT, supra note 14, at 71.
341. Following the failure of Congress to pass the International Dolphin Conservation
Act in the 104th Congress, Mexico suspended its active participation in the La Jolla
Agreement While this decision sent a signal of potential jeopardy to the voluntary program,
Mexico, in a good faith effort to show continued support of the Panama Declaration and its
implementation, decided to continue to allow IATTC observers on its vessels. See 30th
Intergovernmental Meeting on the Conservation of tunas and dolphins in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean, La Jolla, California, October 21-23, 1996 (statement of Mexico announcing decision
to suspend active participation in Law Jolla Agreement) (on file with the Ocean & Coastal
Law Journal).
342. CONG. REC. S 11618 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1996) (statement Sen. Breaux).
* Ed. note: After this article was submitted by the Authors for publication, an Act to
amend the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to support the International Dolphin
Conservation Program in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean was introduced on January 21,
1997. This Act implemented the regime of dolphin conservation contemplated by the
Declaration of Panama, supra, note 5. The Act was successfully adopted on the Senate floor
and was passed on to the House for adoption. CONG. REC. S. 8294 (daily ed. July 30, 1997).
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